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Medical men who frequently go to law to recover fees generally lose more in
the end than they gain; not only because such attempts to recover often prove
fruitless, but because they excite prejudice and make influential enemies.
DANIEL WEBSTER CATHELL, THE PHYSICIAN HIMSELF FROM GRADUATION TO

OLD AGE 292 (1925).

I. INTRODUCTION
In the vast majority of health care interactions, patients in the United States
regardless of their insurance status-bear some direct financial liability to medical
providers.' Whether they are not-for-profit hospitals or for-profit small
businesses, health care providers cannot be indifferent to the collection of these
obligations. Consultants in medical practice management have developed and
marketed extensive advice for structuring all aspects of providers' interactions
with patients to mimic commercial transactions in other retail service contexts.2
This advice, if successful, shields providers from the public scrutiny of after-the
fact debt collection through lawsuits and liens. 3
Medical practice management affects the study of the financial burden
imposed by health care. In recent years, lawmakers and scholars have debated the
role of medical problems in fueling personal bankruptcy filings. Some scholars
measure medical-related bankruptcy using survey techniques. Skeptics of survey
based findings often cite studies of bankruptcy court records that yield more
conservative estimates. Court record studies look for evidence of claims by
creditors with medical identities in the documents that bankruptcy filers submit
to the court.
A clash over these methods arose directly prior to the passage of the

1. See infra Part II.A.
2. See, e.g., Anna Wilde Matthews, Beyond Co-Pay: Surprise Bills at the Doctor's; To Ensure
They Get Paid, Doctors Seek Entire Bill for Patient Share Upfront, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2009, at
DI (citing a doctor reporting that office staff had to train patients to see doctor visits like a trip to
Walmart-"pay before leaving").
3. For scrutiny of that debt collection, see, for example, Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider,
Patients as Consumers: Courts, Contracts, and the New Medical Marketplace, 106 MICH. L. REv.
643 (2007); George A. Nation, III, Obscene Contracts: The Doctrine of Unconscionability and
Hospital Billing of the Uninsured, 94 KY. L. J. 101 (2005).

240

MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS

Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. 4 This bill
was the most significant set of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code in a
generation and substantially restricted debt relief for individual filers. Lawmakers
who opposed the bankruptcy bill cited a 2005 study by Himmelstein, Thome,
Warren, and Woolhandler finding that approximately half of bankruptcies were
medical-related. 5 Supporters of the bankruptcy bill countered with a court record
analysis conducted within the Department of Justice (DOJ). According to the
DOJ analysis, over half of the sample (54%) had no medical debt at all, the
average medical debt among those with any such debt was under $5,000, and
medical debt comprised only 5.5% of the total unsecured debt of the sample. 6
More recently, debates about health care finance intensified public interest in the
financial impact of medical bills and these methodological disputes. In the
summer of 2009, Himmelstein et al. reported that 62% of personal bankruptcies
could be construed as medical-related. 7 President Obama used medical
bankruptcy rates as a rationale for health care reform. 8 Lawmakers held hearings
on whether the current health care system is bankrupting American families. At
one such hearing in July 2009, Representative John Conyers cited the

4. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8,
119 Stat. 23 (2005).

5. See infra Part 11.A.2.
6. See infra p. 265, tbl.l.
7. David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, Elizabeth Warren & Steffie Woolhandler, Medical
Bankrnptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a National Study, 122 AM. J. MED. 741, 742
(2009).
8. President Obama cited the Himmelstein study during his campaign and has continued to
reference the connection between medical bills and bankruptcy in statements to Congress. See
BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN'S PLAN To LOWER HEALTH CARE COSTS AND ENSURE
AFFORDABLE, ACCESSIBLE HEALTH COVERAGE FOR ALL I, 1 (2008), http://www.barackobama.com/
pdf/issues/HealthCareFul!Plan.pdf ("Over half of all personal bankruptcies today are caused by
medical bills."). ln an address to a joint session of Congress in early 2009, the President stated that
"the crushing cost of health care ... is a cost that now causes a bankruptcy in America every thirty
seconds." President Barack Obama, Address to Joint Session of Congress (Feb. 24, 2009),
available at http://www.whiteh9use.gov/the_press_office/remarks-of-president-barack-obamaaddress-to-joint-session-of-congress. "In a letter to Democratic Senate leaders . . . the President
said: 'Health-care reform is not a luxury.... [S]piraling premiums and out-of-pocket expenses are
pushing [families] into bankruptcy and forcing them to go without the checkups and prescriptions
they need."' Catherine Arnst, Study Links Medical Costs and Personal Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS WEEK,
June
4,
2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/
dnflash/content/jun2009/db2009064_ 666715.htm.
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Himmelstein study as evidence that health care reform was urgently needed. 9 But
a scholar from the American Enterprise Institute countered by citing the earlier
DOJ court record analysis and its more modest assessment of the role of medical
debt in bankruptcy. 10
Here, we provide the first attempt to reconcile these competing methods of
measuring medical burden, applying both the survey method and court record
method to the same set of filers in a single dataset. Our dataset, the 2007
Consumer Bankruptcy Project ("2007 CBP"), is a nationally representative
sample of people who filed for bankruptcy in early 2007. This dataset consists of
hundreds of variables from court records, questionnaires, and telephone
interviews. It was compiled by professors of law, medicine, and sociology at
seven major research universities, including one of the authors of this Article.
The court record medical debt in our sample is patterned very consistently
with the earlier DOJ sample. Someone who used the DOJ analysis to suggest that
medical bills were not a problem in bankruptcy presumably would be nearly as
happy to cite the court record analysis of our dataset.
However, when we compare the court record method and survey method as
applied to the same dataset, court records routinely reflect smaller or even zero
medical obligations for filers who report out-of-pocket expenses on the
questionnaire. Indeed, one out of four respondents who explicitly reported
medical bills as a reason for filing for bankruptcy has court records with zero
identifiable medical debt.
After exploring several theories for these discrepancies, we observe that the
deviations are quite consistent with filers' medical bill management. In other
words, due to credit use, the court record method is incapable of capturing some
of the most significant medical obligations incurred before bankruptcy. For
example, respondents who reported significant out-of-pocket expenses, but had
little or no detectable medical debt in their court records, reported credit card and
mortgage use for medical bills at significantly higher rates than other
respondents. 11 Respondents who specifically cited medical bills as a reason for
filing for bankruptcy mortgaged their homes to pay medical bills at nearly four

9. See Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
4 (July 28, 2009) (opening statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Conyers090728.pdf.
JO. See id. at IO (written testimony of Apama Mathur, Research Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mathur090728.pdf.
11. See infra p. 276, fig.4.
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times the frequency of other filers. 12 They also were more than a third more likely
than other filers to use credit cards for medical bills. 13 These mortgages and
credit card bills are invisible in the court record method because they bear no
sign of medical identity. Thus, the court record method, by itself, produces an
estimate of medical burden that is not merely more conservative across the board,
but skewed.
The distortion in the court record method does not seem to apply to all
demographic groups uniformly, probably due to factors we cannot directly
measure, such as access to credit and access to health care. Thus, interesting
patterns emerge when we disaggregate our national sample on the basis of age,
race, sex, and housing tenure. Court records make some filers appear as if they
had incurred distinctively high medical debt because they were less likely to use
credit cards or mortgages for medical bills. For similar reasons, other groups of
filers have quite similar medical debts in the court records even though they
incurred very different amounts of medical obligation prior to filing. Again,
significant variations in medical debt management alter the picture the court
records provide.
The findings reveal the problems with relying exclusively on court records
to measure the financial impact of medical care. They also provide another
perspective on the financial end of medical practice with which this article began.
As previously noted, non-legal writings advise how medical providers should
manage the risk of transacting with patients, in part because these writers have
long feared that patients will put doctors at the bottom of the priority list of bills
to pay. 14 The respondents in the current study often were facing financial
difficulties when they sought medical care. 15 Yet, by the time they filed for
bankruptcy, respondents had considerably reduced providers' direct financial
exposure. This suggests that even patients with modest incomes and high debt-toincome ratios feel a sense of responsibility to their doctors. Alternatively, they
are responding to providers' encouragements to reduce their direct liability.

12. See infra p. 274, fig.3.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., DANIEL WEBSTER CATHELL, THE PHYSICIAN HIMSELF FROM GRADUATION TO OLD
AGE 292 (1925). See also sources cited irifra Part IV.
15. In telephone interviews with a large subset of respondents in our sample, 44% reported
that they had seriously struggled financially for more than two years before filing for bankruptcy.
An additional 27% reported serious struggling for more than one year. We do not have this
information for all respondents in the sample, but the telephone survey subsample is not
significantly different from the whole regarding variables such as filing status, chapter, total assets,
total debts, priority debts, monthly income, and home value. See infra text accompanying note 100.
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This Article proceeds with the following Parts. Part II.A offers background
on out-of-pocket medical bills and medical practice management advice. It then
contextualizes our study by reviewing the methodological and political dispute
over measuring medical burden among bankruptcy filers. Part II.B describes our
dataset, giving special attention to the new questions and variables that enabled
this study. Part III reports our findings. Part IV highlights some implications of
our study for understanding the burden of health care spending on families and
medical practice management.
II. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

A. Managing Out-of-Pocket Liability
1. In General

For many reasons, today's health care finance system expressly imposes
cost-sharing and direct patient liability on patients who are covered by health
insurance. 16 According to The Coker Group, a health care industry consultant
firm, 90% of patients owe money directly at the time of service. 17 Furthermore,

16. See generally PAUL B. GINSBURG, ROBERT WOOD JOJ-INSON FOUND., HIGH AND RISING
HEALTH CARE COSTS: DEMYSTIFYING U.S. HEALTH CARE SPENDING 19 (2008), available at
http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/ l O1508.policysynthesis.costdrivers.rpt.pdf (discussing consumer
financial exposure as a method of controlling health care spending on low-value new technologies,
assuming consumers have sufficient information); JONATHAN GRUBER, KAISER FAM.FOUND., THE
ROLE OF CONSUMER COPAYMENTS FOR HEALTH CARE: LESSONS FROM THE RAND HEALTH
INSURANCE EXPERIMENT AND BEYOND l (2006) (describing cost-sharing and reporting impact on
utilization and health outcomes); MILLIMAN, 2008 MILLIMAN MEDICAL INDEX 9 (2008) (of the
"$15,609 total medical cost for a family of four under a PPO ...the employee pays about $6,167,"
$2,675 of which is paid in cost-sharing at time of service); McKinsey & Company, Why Americans
Pay More for Health Care, MCKINSEY Q., Dec. 2008, at 9 (noting that the "average" health care
consumer pays 12% of the total cost directly out-of-pocket, in addition to 25% of the premium
cost); Kaiser Fam. Found., Snapshots: Health Care Costs: Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Spending
for Health Care Services, May 2006, http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm050206oth.cfm
(noting that the average share paid out-of-pocket by non-elderly people with private insurance and
any health spending in 2003 was 34%); Ann Kjos, New Prospects for Payment Card Application in
Health Care, Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia Payment Cards Center Discussion Paper l (Nov.
2008),
available
at
http://www.phil.frb.org/payment-cards-center/publications/discussion
papers/2008/ D2008NovemberHealthCareCardApplication.pdf ("[O]ut-of-pocket expenditures,
which consumers pay directly to medical service providers, are not insignificant and are expected
to grow from the current level of about $269 billion.").
17. THE COKER GROUP, MAXIMIZING BILLING AND COLLECTIONS IN THE MEDICAL PRACTICE 41
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obligations to be collected directly from patients represent, on average, 15-20%
of a medical provider's receivables. 18 At least prior to the enactment of health
care finance reform, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services predicted
continued increases in patient out-of-pocket payments. 19 In an analysis of a
recent Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the authors reported that a fifth of
privately insured non-elderly families had out-of-pocket obligations exceeding
5% of their incomes. 20
As an interesting sign of the times regarding direct medical obligations, a
few years ago
bank started issuing a "Healthcare Visa Gift Card."21 The
website for the Visa card lists a variety of occasions for which such a gift might
be appropriate. 22 Although new card orders are no longer being taken, the vendor
of the cards called them a "hot new Christmas gift." 23 Gift-givers could get the
card in amounts ranging from $25 to $5,000, and using the card would be feefree for the recipient for eight months, after which the recipient would pay a
monthly maintenance fee of $1.50. 24 Existing cards may be used for health club
membership and totally elective surgery as well as for dental care and co-pays at
doctors' offices. 25
Certainly many people with modest out-of-pocket obligations or higher

a

(2007).
18. Mitch Patridge & Doug Barry, Compassionate Patient Financing Can Cure a Hospital's
Financial Jlls, 32 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 168, 171 (2006); Richard Haugh, Financial Aid: From
Direct Debits to New Loans, Patients Get New Ways To Pay Off Hospital Bills, HOSP. & HEALTH
NETWORKS, Nov. 2006, at 18. Patridge and Barry note that these receivables represent only 2-5% of
net revenue due to insufficient collection practices. See Patridge & Barry, supra.
19. See Christopher J. Troffer et al., Health Spending Projections Through 2019: The
Recession's lmpact Continues, 29 HEALTH AFF. 522, 526 (2010) (noting a 4.8% average annual
percentage growth for out-of-pocket payments over the projection period 2009-2019).
20. See GRUBER, supra note 16, at 11. This excludes insurance premiums. See, e.g., DIDEM
BERNARD & JESSICA BANTH!N, MED. EXPENDITURE PANEL SURV., FAMILY-LEVEL EXPENDITURES ON
HEALTH CARE AND INSURANCE PREMIUMS AMONG THE U.S. NONELDERLY POPULATION, 2004, 14, 15
(2007) (defining terms used in MEPS surveys).
21. See Givewell.com, Where To Use It, http://www.givewell.com/where-to-use (last visited
Apr. 1, 2010) ("Promote happiness, give a Healthcare Visa Gift Card").
22. See Givewell.com, Occasions To Give, http://www.givewell.com/occasions-to-give (last
visited Apr. 1, 2010).
23. Medical Gift Cards Trendy, HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York,
N.Y.), Feb. 2008, at 11.
24. See Givewell.com, How It Works, http://www.givewell.com/how-it-works/ (last visited
April 2, 2010).
25.Jd.
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incomes pay immediately and without serious consequence. But contemporary
studies continue to report that cost-sharing results in delinquent medical debt
with some prevalence, 26 even for routine care. 27 Nationally representative studies
estimate that tens of millions of households have accrued medical debt and/or
have problems paying medical bills. 28 Concerns about medical debt are
longstanding and have transcended the evolution of health care finance. 29

26. Many published papers and unpublished online policy briefs make this point. For recent
examples, see ANDREW COHEN & CAROL PRYOR, IN DEBT BUT NOT INDIFFERENT: CHAPTER 58 AND
THE ACCESS PROJECT'S MEDICAL DEBT RESOLUTION PROGRAM (2008), available at
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/lnDebtButNotindifferent.pdf; SIDNEY D. WATSON ET AL.,
LIVING IN THE RED: MEDICAL DEBT AND HOUSING SECURITY IN MISSOURI (2007), available at
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/living_in_the_red.pdf; Cathy Schoen et al., How Many Are
Underinsured? Trends Among U.S. Adults, 2003 and 2007, 27 HEALTH AFF. w298, w304 tbl.4
(2008) (reporting that increasingly significant proportions of insured population pay out-of-pocket).
27. See, e.g., PAUL FRONSTIN & SARA R. COLLINS, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INST.,
FINDINGS FROM THE 2007 EBRUCOMMONWEALTH FUND CONSUMERISM IN HEALTH SURVEY 9-10
(2008); WILLIAM LOTTERO ET AL., LOSING GROUND: ERODING HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE
LEAYES
KANSAS
FARMERS
WITH
MEDICAL
DEBT
IO
(2006),
available
at
http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/losing_ground.pdf (nearly 60% with medical debt reported
owing money for routine care); Jessica S. Banthin, Peter Cunningham & Didem M. Bernard,
Financial Burden of Health Care, 2001-2004, 27 HEALTH AFF. 188 (2008) (studying out-of-pocket
obligations plus premium costs across population); PETER J. CUNNINGHAM, CAROLYN MILLER &
ALWYN CASSIL, LIVING ON THE EDGE: HEALTH CARE EXPENSES STRAIN FAMILY BUDGETS 3 (Ctr. for
Studying Health
Sys.
Change,
Res.
Brief No.
10,
2008),
available
at
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/l034/l034.pdf (explaining how trouble paying medical bills
can result from non-catastrophic expenses).
28. In a Commonwealth Fund study, 72 million "working age" people and an additional 7
million over 65 had accrued medical debt and/or problems paying medical bills, an increase over
earlier studies. See SARA R. COLLINS ET AL., LOSING GROUND: How THE Loss OF ADEQUATE
HEALTH INSURANCE Is BURDENING WORKING FAMILIES: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH FUND
BIENNIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEYS, 2001-2007, vii (Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief, 2008),
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-Reports/2008/Aug/
Losing-Ground--How-the-Loss-of-Adequate-Health-Insurance-Is-Burdening-Working-Families-8212-F inding.aspx; see also Schoen et al., supra note 26 (reporting 16% were contacted by debt
collectors about medical bills). In another study, 57 million people in 2007 (14 million more than in
2003) were in households with trouble paying medical bills. PETER J. CUNNINGHAM, TRADE-OFFS
GETTING TOUGHER: PROBLEMS PAYING MEDICAL BILLS INCREASE FOR U.S. FAMILIES 2003-2007, 1
(Center for Studying Health Sys. Change, Tracking Rep. No. 21, 2008), available at
http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/l 017/1017.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Jonathan Cohn, This Won't Hurt a Bit: Health Care Reform/or Dummies, NEW
REPUBLIC, Feb. 18, 2009, at 18 (reporting on the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care from the
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Health policy researchers and patient advocates have articulated specific
worries about how medical debt affects patients and their families. Prominent
examples of such worries include the following: patients may self-ration
medically necessary care and drugs; 30 medical providers may deny nonemergency care; 31 patients may self-ration important nan-medical expenses; 32
providers or their designees may engage in harsh formal debt collection
activity; 33 patients may experience adverse psychological consequences from fear
about medical debt that in turn may aggravate health conditions; 34 certain
demographic groups may be disproportionately impacted by cost-related or debtrelated access problems; 35 and patients may experience pressures to convert

1930s and the concern that medical bills destabilize household finances); Editorial, Most People
Need No Aid To Pay the Doctor's Bill, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. IO, 1953, at 10, 12 (arguing
that U.S. News story was an overreaction to data from academic study); Special Report: Doctor
Bills Pile Up: How Can Families Pay?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 17, 1952, at 65-70
(reporting on academic study finding that one in five families had outstanding medical debt).
30. This point is frequently made. For a few recent entries to the literature, see, for example,
PETER J. CUNNINGHAM & LAURIE E. FELLAND, FALLING BEHIND: AMERICANS' ACCESS TO MEDICAL
CARE DETERIORATES, 2003-2007, 2 (Center for Studying Health Sys. Change, Tracking Rep. No.
19, 2008), available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/993/993.pdf (noting cost was "most
frequently cited-and growing--obstacle to care"); Cathy Schoen et al., In Chronic Condition:
Experiences of Patients with Complex Health Care Needs, in Eight Countries, 2008, 28 HEALTH
AFF. wl, w5 (2008) (discussing cost-related deterrence of treatment, particularly among U.S.
patients); Robert W. Seifert & Mark Rukavina, Bankruptcy Is the Tip of a Medical-Debt Iceberg,
25 HEALTH AFF. w89, w90 (2006).
31. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28, at 3 ("In 2007, about l O percent of people with
medical bill problems reported being denied care by medical providers directly as a result of their
medical bill problems.").
32. See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 27, at 4-5 (discussing families who are late on
mortgages and cut down other expenses due to medical bill problems); id. at 8 (discussing choice
between medical bills and keeping children housed and fed); Robert W. Seifert, Home Sick: How
Medical Debt Undermines Housing Security, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 325 (2007).
33. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby & Elizabeth Warren, Beyond Hospital Misbehavior: An
Alternative Account of Medical-Related Financial Distress, JOO Nw. U. L. REv. 535 (2006)
(documenting concerns of patient advocates).
34. See, e.g., CAROL PRYOR, ANDREW COHEN & JEFFREY PROTTAS, THE ILLUSION OF
COVERAGE 9 (2007), available at http://www.accessproject.org/adobe/the_illusion_of_courage.pdf;
Wilhelmine Miller, Elizabeth Richardson Vidgor & Willard G. Manning, Covering the Uninsured:
What Is It Worth?, HEALTH AFF. W4-157, W4-162 (Web Exclusive Mar. 2004) ("The social stigma
and psychological stresses of medical indigency, health care debt, and bill collection efforts are
themselves burdensome.").
35. See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. PATCHIAS & JUDITH WAXMAN, WOMEN AND HEALTH COVERAGE:
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medical debt into third-party credit that could substantially increase the size of
those bills and other consequences. 36
The world looks different from the perspective of the medical practice
management field. As the following paragraphs will illustrate, writers in this field
focus on protecting health care providers, rather than patients, from unpaid debt.
While scholars from many disciplines continue to debate whether medical care
should be treated as an ordinary commodity,37 those on the front lines of practical

THE AFFORDABILITY GAP 5-6 (Commonwealth Fund Issue Brief, 2007), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/pdf/NWLCCommonwealthHealthinsurancelssueBrief2007.pdf (reporting on
medical debt among people with health insurance).
36. See, e.g., SARA COLLINS ET AL., THE COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE AFFORDABILITY CRISIS IN
HEALTH CARE: FINDINGS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH FUND BIENNIAL HEALTH INSURANCE SURVEY
32 (2004 ), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_ doc/collins_biennial2003 _ 723 .pdf
(one in five medical debtors had large credit card debt or home mortgage to pay medical bills);
DEMOS & CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LEARNING, THE PLASTIC SAFETY NET: THE REALITY BEHIND DEBT
IN AMERICA 56-57 (2005), available at http://www.demos.org/pubs/PSN_low.pdf (reporting that
medical bills contributed to credit card debt for 29% of low and middle income households); NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNHEALTHY PURSUITS: How THE SICK AND VULNERABLE ARE HARMED BY
ABUSIVE
MEDICAL
COLLECTION
TACTICS,
36
(2005),
available
at
http://www.consumerlaw.org/news/content/medicaldebt.pdf (suggesting that providers have
encouraged patients to take on high-cost credit for bills); CINDY ZELDIN & MARK RUKAVINA,
BORROWING TO STAY HEALTHY: How CREDIT CARD DEBT Is RELATED TO MEDICAL EXPENSES
(2007), available at http://www.demos.org/pubs/healthy_ web.pdf; Cunningham et al., supra note
27 (giving examples of credit card, mortgages, and personal loan use for medical bills); Brian Grow
& Robert Bemer, Fresh Pain for the Uninsured: As Doctors and Hospitals Turn to GE, Citigroup,
and Smaller Rivals To Finance Patient Care, the Sick Pay Much More, Bus. WK., Dec. 3, 2007, at
34 (reporting on loan arranging for bills of patients who were unaware of the third-party
arrangement); USA Today/Kaiser Family Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health, Health
Care Costs Survey, Summary and Chartpack, Chart 3 (Aug. 2005), available at
http://www.kff.org/newsmedia/upload/7371.pdf (reporting that 8% borrowed money or got second
mortgages because of problems with paying medical bills). In a recent tracking survey, about one in
ten respondents with problems paying medical bills reported that their providers suggested that they
take out loans to meet their health care obligations. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28. Two national
publications recently cited Senator Grassley's concern that medical providers are "cozying up to
banks, debt buyers, and credit card companies over patients' medical bills." Grow & Bemer, supra,
at 34 (quoting a statement that Senator Grassley provided to Business Week); Overdose of Debt:
Lenders Push Risky Credit for Everything from Cancer Care to Botox, CONSUMER REPS., July
2008, at 14, 18 (reporting the same statement).
37. Philip E. Tetlock, Coping with Trade-Offs: Psychological Constraints and Political
Implications, in ELEMENTS OF REASON: COGNITION, CHOICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF RATIONALITY 251
(Arthur Lupia et al. eds., 2000) ("Liberals view the buying and selling of conventional medical
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advice to providers largely proceed from the assumption of commercial
exchange. 38 For the most part, a report published by the American Medical
Association strongly emphasizes this theme, reminding doctors, "It's your
money-ask for it!"39
Medical practice management writings instruct providers on such matters as:
how to get payments up front (including before services are rendered); 40 how to
services and, to some degree, legal services as suspect categories-people seem to be buying
health, life, and justice-whereas conservatives are not bothered by such transactions."); Mark A.
Hall & Carl E. Schneider, The Professional Ethics of Billing and Collections, 300 JAMA 1806
(2008); Pamela Hartzband & Jerome Groopman, Money and the Changing Culture of Medicine,
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101 (2009); Marc A. Rodwin, Medical Commerce, Physician
Entrepreneurialism, and Conflicts of Interest, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 387 (2007);
Deborah A. Stone, The Doctor as Businessman: The Changing Politics of a Cultural Icon, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 533 (1997).
38. See generally Hall & Schneider, supra note 37 (discussing model generally used by health
care providers).
39. Specifically, The Coker Group report advises:
If, for some reason, the patient indicates an inability to make a payment, the staff
member should call the billing manager ... The manager should take the patient to a
private room to discuss payment. The element of authority imposed by the billing or
practice manager indicates that nonpayment is unacceptable. At the discretion of the
manager, the patient may be allowed to leave without paying, but, preferably, with an
agreed-upon plan for payment. In some cases, a fee should be charged if the patient is to
be billed.... The long-range goal is to develop the understanding that arrangements for
payments must be made in advance of the patient encounter. As with most matters
related to credit and collection policy, it is essential to be consistent across the patient
base. Consistent patterns of collection inform both the staff and the patients that direct
patient payment is important. It's your money-ask for it!

THECOKERGROUP,supra note 17, at42-43.
40. See, e.g., Judy Capko, Physicians Practice Pearls: You Earned It, Now Collect It,
PHYSICIANS PRAC., June 2007, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/
fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/l 008.htm (recommending payments at time of service); Pamela
Lewis Dolan, Collecting the Patient Portion: Being Proactive, Early and Often, AM. MED. NEWS,
April 2, 2007, at 18 (citing health care consultant saying "'Everyone needs to sign on that we are
going to collect co-pays at the time of service.' ... The patient needs to be reminded over and over
that this is the new system."); Kim LaFontana & Kim Williams, Practice Management Lab:
Finding Success with Self-Pay, PHYSICIANS PRAC., July/Aug. 2006, available at
http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/ articlelD/858.htm (referring to
time of service as the "golden moment" for collecting payments from patients); Deborah Shapiro,
How To Address Patient Payments: Can't Pay . .. Won't Pay . .. Should Pay, HEALTH CARE
COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2008, at 3 ("The best time to collect money
from patients is before the service is rendered, or at least right after the service and before they
walk out the door.").
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financially screen patients;41 when to terminate or embargo patients for
nonpayment; 42 how to physically arrange a medical office or hospital to
encourage payment; 43 what color envelopes should be used for medical bill
collection letters;44 and even the optimal physical posture a staff member should

41. For evidence of interest in financial screening of patients, see, for example, Emily Berry,
Taking a Financial History: Determining the Health of Your Patient's Credit Rating, AM. MED.
NEWS, Jan. 19, 2009, at 15; Financial Triage: Innovative Ways That Hospitals Are Looking at
Patient Finances, Bus. WK., Nov. 20, 2008; Dave Hansen, Giving Credit To Get What's Due: How
Doctors Can Help Patients Pay the Bill, AM. MED. NEWS, Jan. 21, 2008, at 15; Overdose of Debt:
Lenders Push Risky Credit for Everything from Cancer Care to Botox, CONSUMER REPS., July
2008, at 14, 17 (reporting on hospitals' use of credit scores or credit reports, and Equifax's
Payment Predictor system); Maximizing Self-Pay Collections: Moving the Process Ahead, HEALTH
CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2009, at 10 (discussing how hospitals
may wish to use credit scoring or reporting "to get a glimpse of the patient's financial situation");
Judy I. Veazie, Point-of-Service Collections: When It's Too Late To Collect, HEALTH CARE
COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2009, at 4, 5 (reporting the use of credit
reports by providers to determine an approach for the self-pay portion of bills).
42. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SOLOMON, THE PHYSICIAN MANAGER'S HANDBOOK: ESSENTIAL
BUSINESS SKILLS FOR SUCCEEDING IN HEALTH CARE 107-08 (2d ed. 2008) (proposing a sample
collection plan, providing suspension of future appointments for a patient who misses two
successive co-payments until payment is satisfied); THE COKER GROUP, supra note 17, at 41, 57
(recommending the dismissal of a chronic non-paying patient from a medical practice, particularly
if it seems that the patient is not really in financial hardship); Dolan, supra note 40, at 18
(paraphrasing Jeff Peters, CEO of Health Directions, a Chicago-based consulting firm, "[t]here's no
crime in telling patients their balance must be paid or arrangements for payment be made before
they get another appointment"); Shirley Grace, Physician Beware: 'The Dog Ate My Checkbook, '
PHYSICIANS PRAC., Feb. 2009, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/
fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/1285.htm; Wayne J. Gugliemo, When Patients Can't Pay:
You 'II Collect More of What You 're Owed-and Enhance Loyalty-If You Have a Payment Plan,
MED. ECON., June 3, 2005, at 49. One author compared conditioning treatment on payment for prior
service to conditioning a future movie rental on payment for a prior rental. Curt Mayse, Front Desk
as Profit Center, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Apr. 2005, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/
index/fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/641.htm.
43. See, e.g., Suz Redfearn, Pay Up, Self-Payer: Getting the Most from Patients Who Pay Outof-Pocket, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Mar./Apr. 2002, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/
index/fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/293.htm (recommending that offices be set up to require
patients to pass the collections desk on the way to the exit).
44. See, e.g., Ten Tips for Improving Collection Letters, HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen
Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2009, at 12 (recommending medical providers "[t]est pastelcolored envelopes that will stand out against other mail" and "the use of PS to emphasize ..
strongest points" relating to collection).
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assume when attempting to collect from patients. Sources recommend making a
"game" out of billing for employees to maximize receipts 46 or motivating billing
and collections employees with coffee cups, T-shirts, gift certificates, additional
47
vacation days, or merit certificates.
If doctors adhere to the advice with some success, they may be able to avert
48
the need for formal and more public ex post debt collection efforts. The practice
management literature thus implicitly and explicitly encourages medical
providers to shift the risk of patient default to third-party creditors: the common
advice is, whenever possible, to "push the problem of nonpayment on to someone
else.',49

45. Collecting Assertively Is an Acquired Skill: Confidence and Empathy Are Key, HEALTH
CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2007, at 7, 8 (recommending "good
posture-no slouching" while collecting medical bills in person or on the phone).
46. Dolan, supra note 40.
47. THE COKER GROUP, supra note 17, at 38.
48. See, e.g., Robert B. Avery et al., An Overview of Consumer Data and Credit Reporting, 89
FED. RES. BULL. 47, 67, 69 (2003) (using earlier data, estimating that medical bills accounted for
18.2% of court judgments on credit reports and 52.2% of collection agency actions).
49. Karen Caffarini, Keeping Rubber Checks from Clogging Revenue Flow, AM. MED. NEWS,
Jan. 26, 2009, at 13; see also SOLOMON, supra note 42 (to make patient prioritize medical bills,
"[r]emind the patient that he or she can use a credit card"); THE COKER GROUP, supra note 17, at
41; Jeffrey C. Levitt, Transfer of Financial Risk and Alternative Financing Solutions, 30 J. HEALTH
CARE FIN. 21, 26 (2004) ("Likewise, medical providers would rather have another party take the
financial exposure from patients rather than keep it on their own balance sheets. They are in the
business of providing health care, not consumer financing."); Patridge & Barry, supra note 18, at
169-170 ("Whether in the form of credit cards, bank loans, or the more widely used electronic
paper-free funding programs, it is critical that the hospital offer reasonable options to the patient
without placing additional financial burdens on the hospital, such as carrying long-term payment
plans."); Dolan, supra note 40 (reporting on consultant advising that medical practices should
accept "all credit cards"); Mari Edlin, A Fair Trade?: Make Payment Policies Fair and Legal,
PHYSICIANS PRAc., Nov. 2001, available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/
fuseaction/articles.details/articleID/270.htm (citing practice manager saying: "We're not a bank.
Take out a loan or charge it."); Gugliemo, supra note 42 (noting that experts suggest encouraging
patients to put bill on credit card, rather than payment plan with provider, if patient is employed
and not in particularly bad financial shape to "shift[ ] the credit burden . . . to the credit card
company"); Pamela Moore, Billing and Collections: Playing Hardball: Advice on Charging
Interest and Late Fees on Past-Due Patient Accounts, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Apr. 2008, available at
http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/articlelD/1142.htm
(encouraging providers to get patients to use credit cards for balances, or to encourage patients to
borrow money from companies like CareCredit so "patient can work out his troubles with someone
else"); Redfearn, supra note 43 (citing consultant recommending that providers "forge relationships
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Credit cards facilitate the expectation in the health care marketplace that the
patient will resolve the self-pay portion of a medical bill in a "retail business"
fashion at the time of service.so Health care is analogized to hotels and car rental
businesses when authors recommend that medical providers take credit card
imprints before seeing or treating the patient.s 1 Health industry consultants have
extended such analogies by recommending "sales finance programs similar to
those offered by appliance and auto dealers" for particularly large out-of-pocket
medical expenditures.s2
Providers and hospitals commonly take credit cards notwithstanding the
servicing fees they must pay,s 3 and a Federal Reserve Payment Card Center
researcher has noted that doctors' offices more routinely include credit and debit
card kiosks.s 4 Not surprisingly, providers that have minimized ongoing patient
receivables report a higher rate of identifying credit cards as an acceptable

with local banks that can quickly arrange to grant small loans to patients").
50. See Elizabeth S. Roop, Debt load: Building a Better Payment Plan (for Hospitals and
their Patients), 82 HOSPITALS & HEALTH NETWORKS 46, 47 (June 2008) (reporting on how a
medical facility "vigorously pursues upfront payments ... [p ]atients are given the opportunity to
make a payment over the phone, which speeds collection for the hospital. A 20 percent discount is
provided for up-front payments..."); Hansen, supra note 41; Kris Hundley, As Medical Costs
Grow, Creditors Get in the Game, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at ID, available at 2008
WLNR 3634947 (referring to retail business model); Patrick Reilly, Extracting Payment; Hospitals
Try Collecting Before Patients Leave ER, Moo. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 17, 2003, at 8; Veazie, supra
note 41, at 4, 5 ("Point-of-service tools, including the acceptance of credit cards, are very
important.").
5 I. Nick A. LeCuyer & Shubham Singha!, Overhauling the US Health Care Payment System,
MCKINSEY
Q.,
June
2007,
at
6
(Web
Exclusive),
available
at
https://www.tipaaa.com/pdf/0verhauling%20the%20US%20Health%20Care%20Payment%20Syst
em-McKinsey"lo20Report.pdf"toffering hotel and car rental analogy); Jayne Oliva, Consumer
Directed Health Care: Zeroing in on Physician Practices, PHYSICIAN EXECUTIVE, May/Jun. 2005,
at 66, 67 ("Today's self-service generation will impel health care to mirror the banking industry" in
terms of service delivery formats.).
52. LeCuyer & Singha!, supra note 51, at 6.
53. See, e.g., Jonathan G. Bethely, Collecting Patients' Share Up-Front Getting Easier, AM.
MED. NEWS, Feb. 27, 2006, at I; Edlin, supra note 49 (noting that majority of physician offices
accept credit cards); Levitt, supra note 49 (reporting that most hospitals accept credit cards for
payment). But see Credit Cards and Medical Expenses: Combination Creates Dilemma for
Patients, Providers, RECEIVABLES REP., Apr. 2007, at 3 (citing a Hospital Accounts Receivable
Analysis survey in which only 47% of hospitals reported offering their patients the option of paying
bills with credit cards).
54. Kjos, supra note 16.

252

MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS

method of payment (92.2%). 55 Although the total volume of credit card
expenditures for medical bills remains murky, estimates are in the tens of billions
and, at least before the implementation of the Credit Card Accountability,
Responsibility, and Disclosure (CARD) Act of 2009, were expected to
multiply. 56
Issues surrounding medical billing and payment are complicated further in
the context of emergency hospital care. The Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act, enacted in 1986, requires that hospitals provide services to
anyone in need of emergency care, regardless of ability to pay. 57 With emergency
room revenue (or any revenue) being important to a hospital's bottom line,58
much management literature advises on how to effectively seek payment while
complying with federal law. Experts emphasize prompt screening, and one notes,
"[T]he best-performing hospitals ensure that a high percentage of [emergency
department] patients are financially screened prior to discharge." 59 After a patient
is stabilized, emergency department billing and collections practice thus
resembles those practices already discussed. For instance, one consultant advises
against an emergency department layout with multiple exits, which would enable
patients to leave without discussing payment. 60 This same source cites the
benefits of incentive programs for collections staff and lists credit card
equipment as among the "nuts and bolts" of the emergency room collections
process. 61
Credit products designed and offered specifically for patient management of
out-of-pocket medical costs present another avenue for shifting risk away from
providers. 62 Medical providers typically do not bear legal liability for being

55. Dolan, supra note 40.
56. According to secondary reporting on a Visa USA study, credit cards were used for about a
third (or $86 billion in 2005) of paid out-of-pocket health expenditures. Kjos, supra note 16.
McKinsey consultants recently offered a $45 billion estimate in credit card self-pay health
spending, but predicted a multiplication of this figure in the near future. LeCuyer & Singha!, supra
note 51. Some of these estimates preceded the financial crisis.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). Emergency intake personnel are also prohibited from delaying
treatment to inquire about a patient's ability to pay or insurance status. See § 1395dd(h).
58. For evidence that emergency room services are perceived as relatively unprofitable, see
Jill R. Horwitz, Making Profits and Providing Care: Comparing Nonprofit, For-Profit, and
Government Hospitals, 24 HEALTH AFF. 790, 792, exhibit l (2005).
59. Michael S. Friedberg, Patient Access: A New Face for the Revenue Cycle, HEALTH CARE
FIN. MAN., March l, 2007, at 90.
60. Growing Focus on ED Collections: Here Are Tips, HOSP. ACCESS MGMT., Apr. 1, 2009.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Milt Freudenheim, Creating Financing; Medicine on Installment Plan: Doctors
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"arrangers" of credit. 63 By contrast, providers who directly extend credit may be
required to comply with and face potential liability under federal truth-in-lending
laws and regulations, 64 as well as state credit laws or deceptive practices

Offering Loans at 0%, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2007, at Al (describing medical financing as "one of
the fastest-growing parts of consumer credit, led by lending giants like Capital One and Citigroup
and the Care Credit Unit of General Electric"); Grow & Berner, supra note 36 (referring to the
"little-known medical debt revolution" and reporting that "[m]any patients say they don't realize
their debts are being shifted to such interest-charging middlemen as GE Money Bank"); Hansen,
supra note 41. Recent examples of medical-specific credit products, designed largely to supplement
insurance, include the CarePayment card by Aequitas Capital Management, Care Credit by General
Electric, Capital One, Citigroup, Hospital Expense Loan Program (HELP Financial), U.S. Bank's
medical card, Complete Care, and MedKey Inc. See Schoen et al., supra note 26, at w307 (referring
to medical debt as new growth industry); Card Industry Looks To Seal a Health Care Payments
Gap, CARDS & PMTS (2007) (discussing CarePayment credit cards); Grow & Berner, supra note 36
(reporting on interest rates charged by medical credit providers, but noting that interest is not
always charged when parties buy the debt at discount and expect to collect full amount); Hundley,
supra note 50 (reporting on hospital relationships with medical credit providers and interest rates as
compared to some in-house payment plans); Overdose of Debt: Lenders Push Risky Credit for
Everything from Cancer to Botox, CONSUMER REPS., July 2008, at 14 (listing medical credit
"pitches" to patients and doctors); MedKey Healthcare Finance, http://www.medkeyinc.com (last
visited Apr. 8, 2010) (offering line of credit for medical bills, 90 days interest-free, 5.99%
thereafter).
63. Federal consumer credit laws no longer include arrangers of credit under the Truth in
Lending Act (TILA). King v. Second City Constr. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15696, at *9 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 30, 1997) ("At one time, the definition of creditor under the TILA and its implementing
regulations included 'arrangers of credit.' However, that portion of the definition was deleted from
both the statute and the regulations in 1982."). We could find no evidence that state loan arranger
or broker statutes have been applied to medical providers. For an example of a state broker statute,
see, for example, IND. CODE ANN. § 23-2-5-3(e) (Lexis Nexis 2009) (defining a loan broker as "any
person who, in return for any consideration from any source procures, attempts to procure, or
assists in procuring, a loan from a third party or any other person, whether or not the person seeking
the loan actually obtains the loan").
64. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(l 7) (2008) (portion of regulation Z defining creditor as "a person (A)
who regularly extends consumer credit that is subject to a finance charge or is payable by written
agreement in more than 4 installments (not including a down payment), and (8) to whom the
obligation is initially payable, either on the face of the note or contract, or by agreement when there
is no note or contract"). See also Bright v. Ball Memorial Hosp., 616 F.2d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 1980)
(finding that a hospital can be "creditor" for purposes of TILA); James H. Backman, Consumer
Credit and the Learned Professions ofLaw and Medicine, 176 B.Y.U. L. REV. 783 (1976); William
D. Warren & Thomas R. Larmore, Truth in Lending: Problems of Coverage, 24 STAN. L. REV. 793,
819-20 (1972) (discussing refusal to exempt medical providers and other "professionals" from
TILA, but noting some accommodations for installment payment practices); Edlin, supra note 49
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statutes. 65 This divergence in legal consequences not only contributes to
providers' reluctance to charge interest when they do extend credit, 66 but also
increases the attractiveness of matching patients with specialty credit products.
Medical credit products are becoming integrated with health care finance
more generally: some providers of insurance products or self-insuring companies

(recommending disclosures to comply with TILA if providers use payment plans); Gugliemo,
supra note 42; Hansen, supra note 41; Moore, supra note 49 (recommending late fees rather than
interest to ease TILA compliance); Practice Pointers: When Patients Can't Pay, MED. ECON., June
3, 2005 (discussing legal implications of falling within consumer credit definitions); Todd Stein,
Patients, Pay Up! You'd Better Have a Financial Policy, PHYSICIANS PRAC., Mar. 2005, available
at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/article1D/629.htm (warning
providers that if they charge interest, they should have an attorney review their policy for
compliance with lending laws: "Because the rules are complex, most practices choose not to charge
interest on balances owed.").
65. See, e.g., Anderson v. Southeast Ala. Med. Ctr., 381 So. 2d 68, 70 (Ala. Civ. App. 1979)
(finding that defendant hospital was a "creditor" under ALA. CODE § 5-19-1(3) (1975), but not
imposing finance charges for outstanding debt). See also Richard M. Alderman, The Business of
Medicine-Health Care Providers, Physicians, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 26 Haus. L.
REV. 109, 140 (1989).
66. The AMA Code of Medical Ethics, which is non-binding on physicians, suggests that
providers notify patients of the possibility of charging interest in advance of treatment. See AMA
Code of Medical Ethics, Opinion 6.08 (Interest Charges and Finance Charges) (1994), available at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-ethics/code-medical-ethics/
opinion608.shtml. But charging interest does not seem to be the norm among medical providers.
See Edlin, supra note 49 (reviewing negative aspects of doctors imposing finance charges); Moore,
supra note 49 (citing consultant characterizing charging interest as "touchy area" and discouraging
it); Stein, supra note 64 ("[M]ost practices choose not to charge interest on balances owed.");
Hansen, supra note 41 (citing a consultant reporting that "many" medical practices do not charge
interest, but that "it is prevalent for expensive medical procedures" and another consultant saying
that "it's common for physicians to collect bills without charging interest," and a practice group
reporting that it charges 6% annual interest if the bill is unpaid for more than six months); Cheryl
L. Toth, Payment Plans/or Patients: Better Collections for You, PHYSICIANS PRAc., Jan./Feb. 2003,
available at http://www.physicianspractice.com/index/fuseaction/articles.details/articlelD/365.htm
(discussing downsides of charging interest). For a recent controversial example, see Press Release,
The Office of Attorney General Lori Swanson, Attorney General Lori Swanson Files Suit Against
Allina Health System for Charging Usurious 18% Interest on Medical Debts (Jan. 22, 2009),
http://www.ag.state.mn. us/Consumer/PressRelease/090 l 22Allinalnterest.asp (alleging provider
charged 18% interest on outstanding balances up to $4,999 and 12% on balances from $5,000 to
$9,999 in violation of Minnesota law); MINN. STAT.§ 334.01(1) (2008) (stating the legal standard
interest rate of 6% annually and maximum rate of 8%).
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join with banks to offer lines of credit for the self-pay portion of bills. 67 Health
savings accounts (HSAs), part of high-deductible health plans, may be directly
linked with credit or debit cards. 68 The justification for offering adjunct credit
products is to allow consumers to bridge the gap between large deductibles and
more meager HSA contents. 69 Several companies have filed applications for
business method patents for HSA payment systems with credit line components,
suggesting significant investment in the combination of financing approaches. 70

67. See, e.g., Freudenheim, supra note 62, at A2l ("Big insurers, too, are devising new
financing plans with various payback options."); John Carroll, Banks Give Insurers an Offer Most
of Them Cannot Refuse, MANAGED CARE, July 2006, http://www.managedcaremag.com/
archives/0607/0607.banks.html ("Companies with self-funded or self-insured health plans started
offering employees a line of credit" from a bank that is a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group, "the
OnePay Plan."); One Bill, OnePay: Pilot Program Simplifies Billing for Consumers and
Physicians, HUB MAG., 2006, http://www.hubmagazine.net/pdfs/Ol4909_ OnePay.pdf (discussing a
pilot program in which the interest rate was set at the prime rate, and consumers made payment
through payroll deductions). See generally E. Haavi Morreim, High-Deductible Health Plans:
Litigation Hazards for Health Insurers, 18 HEALTH MATRIX l, 30 (2008) (describing OnePay plan
and potential problems); LeCuyer & Singha), supra note 51 (recommending that insurance
providers offer credit lines to policy holders); Sarah Rubenstein, In New Health Plan, Patients Pay
Their Share-Or Else, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2006, at Bl.
68. See, e.g., Jennifer Roy, HSA Lines of Credit, HSA HEALTHLINE (Choice Fin., Fargo, N.D.),
Nov. 2007, available at http://www.choicefinancialgroup.com/hsa/healthline_newsletters
/nov07.pdf(providing terms for Choice Financial's line of credit); Chase Health Savings Account,
Healthcare Line of Credit, http://www.choicefinancialgroup.com/files/HSA_Guide.pdf (last visited
Apr. 9, 2010) (setting rate at 13.99% for interest rate on credit line); Provident Bank, Health
Savings Account (HSA) Line of Credit, https://www.mtb.com/personal/healthsavingsaccount/
Pages/HSA.aspx (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (describing loans up to $10,000 and encouraging use of
line of credit as overdraft protection); Visa Health Savings Account Card,
http://usa.visa.com/personal/cards/prepaid/healthcare-card.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2010)
(combining line of credit with health insurance identification card, capability of accessing other
accounts, and reimbursement arrangements); US Bank, Health Savings Solution Product Guide,
https://healthsavings.usbank.com/usbankhsa/forrns/Health%20Savings%20Solution%20product%2
Oguide.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2010) (including line of credit); see also CARDS & PMTS, supra note
62; Tony Miller, Getting on the Soapbox: Views of an Innovator in Consumer-Directed Care, 25
HEALTH AFF. w549, w550 (2006); Companies Offer Nation's First Credit Line to Owners ofHealth
Savings Accounts, Bus. WIRE, June 27, 2005; Haugh, supra note 18, at 18.
69. See, e.g., UMB Healthcare Services' Dennis Triplett Offers Perspective on HSA Line of
Credit Solution, Bus. WIRE, Aug. 2, 2006, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/bankingfinance/banking-lending-credit-services-cash/5345119-1.html.
70. See, e.g., Method for Maintaining & Providing Health Savings Accounts (HSAs), U.S.
Patent Application No. 20060200397 (filed Sept. 7, 2006).

256

MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS

In summary, the current health care system features constant, regular
financial transacting between providers and their patients regardless of patients'
insurance status. The sizeable number of patients with difficulty handling selfpay obligations imposes additional financial risks on providers. The
recommended approaches to managing these risks in light of legal and practical
considerations encourage early payoff of health care providers and seek to avoid
later direct legal enforcement to the extent possible.
The practices that providers adopt to shape their financial transacting affect
the ways in which researchers can measure patients' medical burden. We tum to
this matter in the following subsection, focusing specifically on the measurement
of burden for people who have filed for bankruptcy.
2. Measuring Medical Burdens ofBankruptcy Filers

Researchers have differed in their methods of identifying medical bills and
medical problems among people who file for bankruptcy. 71 Most bankruptcy
studies use self-reported information in one form or another. 72 Elizabeth Warren,
Jay Westbrook, and Teresa Sullivan honed the approach of using written
questionnaires and other survey methods in the personal bankruptcy context. 73
With respect to medical problems, Warren, Himmelstein, Woolhandler, and
Thorne wrote a paper that used data from the 2001 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
("2001 CBP") studying filers in five states. A key data source was written
questionnaires, on which respondents could indicate whether they had out-ofpocket medical expenses of at least $1,000 in the two years prior to bankruptcy,
medical uses of second mortgages, and health insurance coverage. Respondents
also could pick reasons for bankruptcy (including illness or injury) from a list of

71. For literature reviews, see Melissa B. Jacoby, Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren,

Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76
N.Y.U. L. REv. 375, 377 (2001) (summarizing earlier literature and referring to the bankruptcy
system as an "overlooked source of information for purposes of the health care finance policy
debates"); Melissa B. Jacoby, The Debtor-Patient Revisited, 51 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 301 (2007)
(distinguishing studies of debt from studies of medical-related financial problems).
72. Most general population studies that include bankruptcy-related questions use selfreported information. See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28; USA Today/Kaiser Family
Foundation/Harvard School of Public Health, supra note 36; APARNA MATHUR, AM. ENTER. INST.,
MEDICAL
BILLS
AND
BANKRUPTCY
FILINGS
(2006),
http://www.aei.org/docLib/
20060719_ MedicalBillsAndBankruptcy.pdf.
73. TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN &JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS (1989) (describing filers from 1981).
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pre-coded options. 74 The 2001 CBP undertook follow-up telephone surveys with
a subset of the filers that reviewed out-of-pocket costs and medical diagnoses in
greater detail. 75 Himmelstein and his coauthors analyzed that dataset and
concluded in their first paper that nearly half of bankruptcies met at least one
criterion for characterization as a "major medical bankruptcy" and more than half
met a slightly more expansive definition of "any medical bankruptcy."76
Published in the peer-reviewed journal Health Affairs as a web exclusive, the
Himmelstein paper was released just as Congress was restarting deliberations on
a major bill to restrict bankruptcy relief. Senator Grassley, a sponsor of that bill,
requested that a division of the DOJ (the Executive Office for United States
Trustees) determine the validity of the Himmel stein findings. 77 Assistant
Attorney General William Moschella submitted a short letter and summary
reporting the frequency and amounts of medical debt detectable in court records
in a sample of "no-asset" chapter 7 cases. 78 Those figures are reprinted in Table 1
in Part III; as noted in the introduction, Attorney General Moschella's letter and
summary conveyed that the medical debt impact was modest. The letter closed

74. David Himmelstein et al., Illness and Injury as Contributors to Bankruptcy, HEALTH AFF.
W5-67 (Web Exclusive Feb. 2, 2005).
75. Id. at W5-69. Among the respondents who participated in telephone interviews and said
they had medical reasons for bankruptcy, the average amount of out-of-pocket expense (excluding
premiums) in the year leading to bankruptcy was over $3,500. Out-of-pocket expense since illness
onset averaged approximately $12,000. Id.
76. Id. at W5-66. Other studies have used the same data for analysis, see, e.g., Jacoby &
Warren, supra note 33 (reanalyzing 2001 CBP data to show different ways to measure medicalrelated bankruptcy), or adopted similar survey instruments for use on different populations. See
WATSON, supra note 26 (using some CBP questions to study Missouri debtors); Ezekial Johnson &
James Wright, Are Mormons Bankrupting Utah? Evidence from the Bankruptcy Courts, 40
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 607 (2007) (replicating methods, finding that 61 % in study of filers in Utah
reported that medical problems contributed to their bankruptcy filings).
77. 151 CONG. REC. S2053, S2078 (Mar. 4, 2005) (reprinting Letter from William E.
Moschella, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. DOJ, to Charles E. Grassley, U.S. Sen. (Feb. 10, 2005)). The
letter characterized the Himmelstein et al. definitions of medical bankruptcy as "very broad" and
highlighted that the article's broader definition of medical bankruptcy included drug addiction and
uncontrolled gambling, id., although those factors were nominal additions to the overall count.
78. For a description of the distinction between an "asset case" and a "no-asset case," see
Dalie Jimenez, The Distribution of Assets in Consumer Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Cases, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 795 (2009). An asset case is one in which there is property to distribute to unsecured
creditors after secured creditors are paid any allowed secured claims and the debtor retains exempt
property. Id. at 798. Accordingly, in a "no-asset case," debtors have no unencumbered non-exempt
assets for distribution to unsecured creditors. Id. at 797.
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by stating, "[T]he conclusion that almost 50 percent of consumer bankruptcies
are 'medical related' requires a broad definition and generally is not
substantiated by the official documents filed by debtors. " 79
Assistant Attorney General Moschella' s observation is based on the
following method: whether coders could find holders of claims that had
demonstrably medical names on "Schedule F," a list of claims that bankruptcy
filers must submit to the court. 80 On Schedule F, debtors list the amount of nonpriority unsecured claims (claims owed to general creditors who lack collateral
for these debts) owed at the time of filing and the identity of the holders of such
claims at that time. The DOJ's summary of findings correctly noted that using
Schedule F would exclude bills owed on the date of bankruptcy to a creditor with
a non-medical name, but neither the summary nor cover letter highlighted or
explained the relevance of this limit for those who would be unfamiliar with the
ramifications. 81
The court record method was not without precedent. Early studies of the
bankruptcy system under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code used court records to start
examining filers and the system. 82 Over time, researchers interested in the
circumstances of bankrupt families began to identify pros and cons to using court
records. 83 As studies of bankruptcy filers have evolved and use of consumer
credit for various household purposes has grown substantially, so have the

79. See supra note 77 (emphasis added).
80. See Official Bankruptcy Forms, Schedule F: Creditors Holding Unsecured Nonpriority
Claims
(Dec.
2007),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/8K_Forms_l207/
B_006F_l207fpdf See also supra note 77.
81. See supra note 77. After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
was enacted, the Director of the United States Trustee Program was circumspect about what could
be gleaned from Schedule F about medical burden. He observed that the Program did not have
"definitive data" on the amount of medical debt owed by bankruptcy filers and that, even with dataenabled forms that the Program hoped to develop, medical debt would be difficult to measure
through those forms. Hearing on Working Families in Financial Crisis: Medical Debt and
Bankruptcy, 110th Cong. 4-5 (2007) (statement of Clifford J. White III, Director, Executive Office
for United States Trustees), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/July2007/
white070717.pdf White's testimony cited 2003 data in which 46% of the filers in no-asset chapter
7 cases included medical debt on Schedule F, about 78% of them reported debt less than $5,000,
and fewer than l % of the cases represented more than one third of the total medical debt. See id. at
4.
82. Examples include SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 73 (regarding filers from 1981); Susan D.
Kovac, Judgment-Proof Debtors in Bankruptcy, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 675 (1991) (describing filers
from 1985-1986).
83. See, e.g., Jacoby et al., supra note 71 (reviewing these concerns).
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number of objections to measuring medical burden with court records. 84
Nonetheless, certain U.S. senators characterized the DOJ response as a
debunking of the Himrnelstein study's finding that medical problems contributed
to about half of bankruptcies. Senator Grassley issued a press release strongly
suggesting that assertions of high percentages of medical-related bankruptcies
were "myth." 85 Senator Sessions also used the DOJ study to suggest that these
percentages were a "fiction. " 86

84. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S6010 (May 26, 2005) (reprinting Letter from David
Himmelstein, Assoc. Professor of Med., Harvard Med. Sch., et al. to Charles E. Grassley, U.S.
Senator (Feb. 14, 2005)). This letter identified a list of debts that likely would be excluded from the
analysis cited in the Moschella letter as well as the implications of including only no-asset chapter
7 cases.
85. Senator Grassley said:
Make no mistake, misrepresentations about this legislation have been running rampant
by those who oppose any meaningful bankruptcy reform. I've been in politics a long
time, and I know that political criticism is never inhibited by ignorance. For instance,
the statistical analysis in the U.S. Trustee's office examined over 5000 bankruptcy cases
and found that under one-half listed medical debts of any sort. And those filers who did
list medical debts, on average, listed under $5000 in medical debts. So much for the
myth that most bankruptcies are driven [sic.] medical costs. The fact is there are abusers
out there. The fact is S. 256 doesn't harm bankrupts with large medical debts. Let's stop
the abuse. Let's return to common sense. Let's enact bankruptcy reform now, before the
abuse gets worse.
Press Release, Opening Statement of Senator Chuck Grassley at the Bankruptcy Reform Hearing
(Feb. I 0, 2005), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfrn?customel_dataPageID_ l 502==9716.
86. Senator Sessions said:
This is what the United States Trustee Program found in a much more extensive
survey... They were asked to survey the filings in their districts to find out what you list
on your filing as your debts, who you owe. You actually list who it is. So, if it is a
doctor bill, it is on there. If you don't put it on there you don't wipe out that debt and
you remain obligated to pay it, so everybody puts every debt they have on the list so it
can be wiped out when they file bankruptcy. What they found was, this professional
study of 5,000 cases, not interviewing debtors but looking at what they put on their
form, they found that only slightly more than 5 percent of the total unsecured debt
reported in those cases was medically related. Only 5 percent was medically related.
This is not 50 percent of the cases in bankruptcy being caused by medical-only 5
percent of them, of the total debt, was medical ... For some people there is no doubt
that medical debts are a cause for bankruptcy. I do not doubt that. But this idea that. .
.we ought to assume that there is no fraud and abuse in bankruptcy and the idea that
everybody is in bankruptcy because of medical debts is just not so.
It is just not; it is a fiction. We need to get it out of our heads.
15 l CONG. REc. S2077 (daily ed. Mar. 4, 2005). Senator Comyn echoed the sentiments, saying:
First, let me say to my friend, the Senator from Alabama, how much I appreciate his
eloquence on this bill and his very successful attempt to explain to the American people,
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Likewise, academic critics of the Himmelstein study highlighted the DOJ
findings and lent credence to the court record method as a valid and useful
measure of medical bill burden. 87 Within a lengthier critique of the Himmelstein
study, two health care finance experts included a full paragraph identifying the
DOJ findings as a counterpoint. 88 They used the DOJ findings to illustrate that
medical debt is only a small proportion of bankruptcy filers' financial
obligations. 89 In written testimony for a congressional hearing, a law professor
described and cited the DOJ findings for the proposition that only a few cases
have sufficiently high medical debt for it to be properly characterized as a cause
of bankruptcy. 90
By 2009, interest in the scope of the medical bankruptcy problem
intensified. Early in the year, then-President-Elect Obama's economic agenda
included making it easier for people in medical-related bankruptcies to receive a
discharge of debt. 91 In the summer of 2009, Himmelstein, Thorne, Warren, and
Woolhandler released a new study estimating that 62% of bankruptcy filings
could be counted as medical-related. 92 That study's release dovetailed with
debates on health care finance reform. In late July 2009, the House Judiciary
Committee called a hearing to discuss whether the health care system was
bankrupting American families. Representative Conyers cited the 2009

as well as to us, what is at stake here, and to knock down some myths that are being
used to try to worry people when, in fact, there is no reason for people to be worried
about this legislation.

Id.
87. These writings also identified a range of other criticisms, unrelated to the data sources,
which are beyond the scope of this Article.
88. David Dranove & Michael Millenson, Medical Bankruptcy: Myth Versus Fact, 25 HEALTH
AFF. w78 (2006) (citing DOJ study and conclusion without qualifications).
89./d.
90. Working Families in Financial Crisis: Medical Debt and Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong.
27-29, 32 (July 17, 2007) (statement of Todd J. Zywicki, Professor, George Mason Univ. Sch. Of
Law).
91. See Posting of Sarah Rubenstein to Wall St. J. Health Blog, Obama Aims To Help Patients
Wipe Away Medical Debts, http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2009/01/07 /obama-aims-to-help-patientswipe-away-medical-debts/ (Jan. 7, 2009, 2:06PM EST) (citing The Obama-Biden Plan,
http://change.gov/agenda/economy_agenda (last visited Apr. 2, 2010) ("Obama and Biden will
create an exemption in bankruptcy law for individuals who can prove they filed for bankruptcy
because of medical expenses. This exemption will create a process that forgives the debt and lets
the individuals get back on their feet.")).
92. Himmelstein et al., supra note 7.
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Himmelstein study as evidence that health care finance reform was urgently
needed. 93 But a witness at the hearing from the American Enterprise Institute
returned to the DOJ findings, which she described as the "closest comparable
survey," to cast doubt on Himmelstein's findings. 94
No one has systematically examined the DOJ's court record method and
why exactly it differs from the Himmelstein study's findings. We undertake that
examination here by imposing both methods on, and collecting both types of
information from, a single population.
B. Data for the Current Study

We analyze information from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project
("2007 CBP"), a nationally representative study of approximately 2,500 personal
bankruptcy cases. 95 The response rate to the questionnaire portion was 50%. 96
Respondents and non-respondents shared similar characteristics on variables such
as income, debt, assets, monthly expenses, and prior bankruptcies. 97 The dataset
has a slight underrepresentation of chapter 13 cases, which we correct with
weighting when necessary. 98 The median age of a filer in the 2007 CBP is 43,
older than the median in the general U.S. population. 99 Median household income

93. Medical Debt: Is Our Healthcare System Bankrupting Americans: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong.
4 (July 28, 2009) (opening statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Conyers090728.pdf.
94. Id. at 6-7 (written testimony of Apama Mathur, Research Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Mathur090728.pdf.
95. Robert M. Lawless et al., Did Bankruptcy Reform Fail? An Empirical Study of Consumer
Debtors, 82 AM. BANKR. L.J. 349, 391 (2008) (describing the methods of the 2007 CBP).
96. Id. at 392.
97. Id. at 396.
98. The average Schedule F medical debt is significantly higher for chapter 7 filers than
chapter 13 filers, but there was no chapter-related difference in the likelihood of reporting medical
debt on Schedule F. In addition, the median Schedule F medical debt for chapter 7 and chapter 13
filers is not significantly different ($1,698 for chapter 7 filers versus $1,384 for chapter 13). Filers
in the two chapters also had a similar distribution of Schedule F debts (as well as questionnaire
expense) across the range, with the differences skewing the averages likely coming largely from the
group of filers with Schedule F medical debts $10,000 and above. Thus, for most of our analysis,
we combine the two kinds of cases without weighting, but indicate where we have used weighting.
99. Deborah Thome, Elizabeth Warren & Teresa A. Sullivan, The Increasing Vulnerability of
Older Americans: Evidence from the Bankruptcy Court, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 87, 92 (2009).
The median age in the general population in 2007 was only 36. l. Id. at 93, fig. l.
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of the sample is less than $28,000. 100 Median net worth is substantially negative
(nearly -$24,400). 101 About half were homeowners when they filed for
bankruptcy, and among them, median mortgage debt was just over $100,000. 102
Respondents completed written questionnaires that included demographic
information and other information about their pre-bankruptcy circumstances. 103
For all respondents, the 2007 CBP also extracted information on approximately
200 variables from court records, many of which are debtor-supplied under
penalty of perjury. The 2007 CBP conducted follow-up telephone surveys with
approximately 1,000 respondents within a year after they filed for bankruptcy. 104
The approach taken in this Article is unique in several respects. First, we
approximate the DOJ method of identifying medical debts from Schedule F in the
court records. 105 This enables replication and closer scrutiny of the DOJ court
record method. Second, we are able to isolate filers who specifically identified
medical bills as a reason for bankruptcy as compared to lost income or the other
ways medical problems can contribute to financial distress. 106 In addition, we use
100. Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 359,404. The mean was under $31,000. Id. at 404. In
terms of income distribution, about 85% of the 2007 CBP respondents had incomes below the U.S.
national median household income in 2007 (undifferentiated by household size), and more than
three in ten had incomes below the "poverty rate" for a family of four. For national median income
figures, see CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA SMITH, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, 5, 7 (2008), available
at http://www.census.gov/prod/2008pubs/p60-235.pdf. For the poverty guidelines, see U.S. Dept.
of
Health
&
Human
Servs.,
The
2006
HHS
Poverty
Guidelines,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/P0VERTY/06poverty.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). The income
distribution of bankruptcy filers in the 2007 CBP is shown in Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 360
fig.2.
101. Lawless et al., supra note 95, at 371,405.
102. Id. at 365.
103. Id. at 399-402 (reproducing questionnaire).
104. Id. at 396. As was previously noted, the telephone survey subsample is not significantly
different from the whole regarding variables such as "filing status, filing chapter, total assets, total
debts, priority debts, monthly income, [and] home value." Id. at 396 n.177.
105. The specific codebook instruction was as follows:
This number represents the sum of debts that appeared to be owed to medical providers.
Debts were counted as medical debts if they were owed to hospitals, doctors, labs,
nursing homes and other treatment facilities, pharmacies, medical collection agencies,
and anything else that looked related to health, medical, wellness, or sickness.
106. Jacoby & Warren, supra note 33, at 563 (2006) (discussing the importance of income
effects of illness or injury). Notably, for this Article, we are not seeking a comprehensive count of
cases that could be construed as medical bankruptcies. In this respect, our study is distinct from the
aim of Himmelstein et al., supra note 7. Still, the explicit "medical bill reason" for bankruptcy
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a more detailed series of questions about out-of-pocket medical expenses that
reveal respondents' medical bill management techniques. Specifically, the
questionnaire asked whether respondents were directly responsible for medical
bills uncovered by insurance within the two years leading up to the bankruptcy
filing. 107 Respondents who said "yes" were asked additional follow-up questions:
How did you, or a spouse or partner, pay for the medical bills or prescriptions
that were not covered by insurance? Did you: Check all that apply: Pay with a
cash, check, or debit card; Pay with a regular credit card; Pay with a medical
credit card (such as CitiHealth Card, CareCredit, or MediCredit); Pay with
money from a home equity loan or line of credit; Agree to a payment plan with
the medical provider; Something else (please specify).

The latter questions help us scrutinize the absence of a medical bill from the
court records and offer a window into the management practices explored in Part
II.A. For this Article, we report findings for all of the responses, and primarily
discuss the options that most directly relate to discrepancies between the court
record method and the survey method: cash, credit card, and home equity
loans. 108 Also, whereas prior surveys asked only whether respondents incurred
more than $1,000 in out-of-pocket expenses, respondents in this study were
asked to identify the amount that they paid out-of-pocket within specified ranges:
less than $1,000; $1,000-$5,000; $5,001-$10,000; and more than $10,000. This
greater specificity enables a better comparison to the court record method and
facilitates a more in-depth analysis of medical burden. Overall, our innovation is
to deploy both the survey method and the court record method on the same
dataset, and to use new methods of analysis to undertake this comparison.

helps identify filers who are likely to have some non-trivial obligation. If court records are a useful
source of information about medical burden, then we at least should be able to find evidence of
substantial medical bills in the records of these respondents.
107. The exact language of question 18 was: "During the TWO years before the bankruptcy,
were you, or a spouse or partner, FINANClALLY responsible for ANY medical bills,
INCLUDING prescription medication or co-payments, that were NOT covered by insurance"
(emphasis in original). The question did not ask the respondent to indicate the specific source of the
cost (doctor, hospital, prescription drugs, etc.).
108. A more in-depth evaluation of payment plans and "something else" (other forms of
payment for medical bill payment not discussed in this Article) will be reported in a separate paper.
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Ill. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

We start by reporting Schedule F medical debt. The left column of Table I
replicates the information the DOJ reported to Congress. The middle column
represents our 2007 CBP data limited to no-asset chapter 7 cases (liquidation
cases) to most closely match the DOJ sample. The right column represents the
2007 CBP full core sample that also includes chapter 13 (repayment plan) cases.
TABLE 1: DOJ AND 2007 CBP SAMPLE COMPARISONS
DOJ Sample (No-Asset 7s
Closed Between 2000 and
2002, Excluding N.C. &
Ala.)

N=5,203
54% listed no medical
debt.

Medical debt accounted for
5.5% of the total general
unsecured debt.

90.1 % reported medical
debts less than $5,000.

1% of cases accounted for
36.5% of all medical debt.
Less than 10% of all cases
represented 80% of all
medical debt.

2007 CBP Sample (NoAsset 7s Only)

2007 CBP Sample (7s and
13s)

All Cases
N= 1,719
48.4% listed no medical
debt (50.6% if including
cases with missing data).
Medical debt accounted for
6.2% of the total general
unsecured debt
($5,851,877 of
$93,095,955).
86.2% reported medical
debts less than $5,000
(88.6% if inflationadjusted to $5,734).
1% of cases accounted for
37.3% of all medical debt.
10% of all cases
represented 80.3% of all
medical debt.

N=2,438
49.8% listed no medical
debt (50% if including
cases with missing data).
Medical debt accounted for
5.6% of the total general
unsecured debt
($7,727,494 of
$136,353,023).
88% reported medical
debts less than $5,000
(92.3 % if inflationadjusted to $5,734).
1 % of cases accounted for
35.4% ofall medical debt.
10% of all cases
represented 79.8% of all
medical debt.
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Cases
N=2,391
Among the cases with
medical debt, the average
medical debt was $4,978
per case ($5,709 in 2007
dollars).
78.4% reported medical
debt below $5,000
(average of$1,212 for this
group).

with Anv Schedule F Medical Debt
N=l,271
N=853
Among the cases with
Among the cases with
medical debt, the average
medical debt, the average
medical debt was $6,313
medical debt was $7,483
per case (weighted by case
per case.
type).
76.1 % reported medical
73.4% reported medical
debt below $5,000; 76.3%
debt below $5,000; 78.8%
with inflation adjustment
with inflation adjustment
(average of $1,394 for this
(average of$1,405 for this
group).
group).
21.6% of cases accounted
21.6% of cases accounted
21.6% of cases accounted
for 80.9% of all medical
for 81.3% of all medical
for 82.4 % of all medical
debt. 109
debt. I I I
debt. 1io
Medical debt accounted for Medical debt accounted for Medical debt accounted for
13.0% of the total general
12.2% of the total general
12.3% of the total general
unsecured debt.
unsecured debt.
unsecured debt.

Table 1 shows that the application of the court record method to the 2007
CBP dataset produces results that are very close to the DOJ results. With respect
to the differences, Table 1 indicates that our court records include a slightly
greater proportion of cases with Schedule F medical debt than the DOJ sample.
Also, our sample's average medical debt, as indicated by the court records, is
higher than the DOJ sample's, even after adjusting the numbers for inflation
using the Consumer Price Index. These increases are consistent with rising
medical costs (at a rate that is outpacing inflation) and self-pay obligations during
the 2000s. Furthermore, because the DOJ reported neither median debt nor a
distribution of the larger debts, it is possible that a small number of large debts
explain the differences in averages. 112 In Figure 1, we report the distribution of
the 8% of our sample with more than $10,000 in Schedule F medical debt,
109. We do not know why the DOJ reported this measure, but we replicate it in this Table.
110. Additionally: I% of cases account for 2.9% of the total medical debt, I 0% of cases
account for 67.4% of the total medical debt, and 20% of cases account for 81.4% of the total
medical debt.
111. Again, we offer more figures: 1% of cases account for 2.5% of the total medical debt,
10% of cases account for 65.3% of the total medical debt, and 20% of cases account for 80% of the
total medical debt.
112. We did not cap or remove outliers (disclosed in Figure I and note 113) because we found
no evidence that the data in the DOJ report capped or excluded outliers. Earlier analyses by U.S.
Trustee researchers appear to include the biggest Schedule F medical debts. See Ed Flynn &
Gordon Bermant, The Class of 2000, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Oct. 2001, at 20 (reporting that "medical
debt-figures were highly skewed by a few debtors with enormous medical debts.").
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subdivided by chapter of bankruptcy filing. 113
FIGURE 1: COURT RECORD MEDICAL DEBT OVER $10,000
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Now that we have verified the similarities between the DOJ and 2007 CBP
court records, we assess how well the court record method reflects prebankruptcy out-of-pocket expenses. To be included in a court record count of
medical bills, a bill must have several qualities. It must be outstanding on the
date of the bankruptcy filing. The filer must know about the bill to report it.
Finally, the holder of the claim must be identifiable as medical to a third-party
coder. Figure 2 displays medical expense of the 2007 CBP sample as indicated
on the questionnaire (the survey method) and on Schedule F (the court record
method. Importantly, the questionnaire asked only about expenses within two
years prior to filing, whereas court records include claims incurred at any time
before filing. This comparison thus suppresses even greater potential differences
between the measures.

113. Of the filers with Schedule F medical debts over $100,000, four were just over this
amount. Two had over $500,000. Three of these six filers were under twenty-five years old.
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FIGURE 2: QUESTIONNAIRE-DERIVED
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As Figure 2 shows, respondents had consistently lower levels of Schedule F
medical debt than out-of-pocket medical expenses incurred within two years
prior to filing. 114 The darker columns in Figure 2, which represent the
questionnaire responses, show that nearly eight of ten respondents reported some
out-of-pocket expenses within two years before filing, whereas medical debt
could be found in the court records of only about five of ten respondents.
We examined the level of congruence between the court record and
questionnaire measures in various ways. We established the Cronbach's alpha
between the two variables, which is 0.609. 115 This level of congruence between
the two measures is low enough to merit concern about the validity of using one

114. As illustrated by Figure I, the distributions of the two measures are different. Written
questionnaire expense forms a unimodal distribution, with a peak at $1,001 to $5,000. Schedule F
medical debt manifests a different pattern, with about half the respondents having zero Schedule F
medical debt, and greater than eight out often reporting $5,000 or less.
115. Cronbach's alpha is a measurement of how well two or more variables "hang together,"
or whether they measure a single latent construct. It is a measure of the reliability or consistency
between the items at hand and is computed through the equation: a = v+
_ cN·c
>_ , where N is the
N-1 -c
number of items, c is the interitem covariance, and v is the average variance of the items. At the
most basic level, Cronbach's alpha allows a researcher to evaluate how well one variable can
replace another variable.
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of these measures as a stand-in for the other. 116
Next, we engaged in a filer-by-filer comparison of the two measures, which
can be explained as follows. First, we compared the dollar value of the court
record and survey measures for each filer. Doing this, we identified about a third
of respondents in our sample (32%) who reported expenses on the questionnaire
based on the survey method, but who had no medical debt in their court records.
Documenting precise declines in dollar amounts when neither number is zero is
more difficult because the questionnaire asked for an estimate of expense by
category rather than an exact dollar amount. But we conservatively estimate that
an additional 56% of the sample had less Schedule F medical debt than
questionnaire-reported expenses. 117
Our second filer-by-filer approach was to subtract a categorized measure of
Schedule F medical debt from the questionnaire medical expenses category for
each respondent. 118 For each case, this produced a nine-point scale ranging from

116. Generally, for comparing groups, a Cronbach's alpha of0.70 to 0.80 or higher allows one
to substitute one variable for another or to create a composite variable using the two measures. See
J. Martin Bland & Douglas G. Altman, Statistics Notes: Cronbach 's Alpha, 314 BRIT. MED. J. 572,
572 (1997).
117. To calculate the differences between questionnaire-reported medical expense and
Schedule F medical debt for this particular finding, we subtracted each individual's reported
expense from Schedule F medical debt, allowing us to compare the two reporting processes in a
"pair-wise" manner. We needed to estimate a dollar amount for expense because the questionnaire
asked only for categories of expenses. To estimate, we took the middle point of each expense
category and used that to calculate the difference. For example, for the category $1,000 to $5,000,
each respondent who reported expenses in that range was assigned a dollar debt amount of
$3,000.50. For those who reported "more than $10,000" in expense, we assigned a dollar amount
of$15,000 for purposes of this analysis. We believe that this is a particularly conservative estimate,
given that on Schedule F, only half of the medical debts over $10,000 were also under $20,000. See
supra p. 267, fig. I. To prevent these respondents from skewing the average difference between the
two measures, we coded anyone who reported "more than $10,000" in expenses on the
questionnaire and reported more than $10,000 in debt on Schedule F as having zero difference
between the the two measures. Again, this allows our measure to be conservative.
118. The initial categories of expense, consistent with the ranges on the questionnaire, are
coded as follows: "zero" means no expense, "I" means under $1,000; "2" represents expense
between $1,000 and $5,000; "3" means expense between $5,001 and $10,000; and "4" represents
more than $10,000. Subtracting the category of Schedule F debt from the category of questionnaire
expense indicated by each respondent yields a number between "-4" and "+4." These numbers thus
take on a meaning different from the original codes. For example, "zero" indicates the same
category of expense on both measures, whether that category is no medical bills or over $10,000 in
medical bills. When we use numbers in the appendices and going forward, we are referring to the
result of this subtraction.
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"-4" to "+4". A "-4" signifies that an individual had more than $10,000 in
Schedule F medical debt and no questionnaire-reported expenses. A "+4"
signifies that an individual had more than $10,000 in expenses on the
questionnaire but no Schedule F medical debt. Appendix A shows the
distribution of cases along this scale.
Most respondents fell within the same category of expenses under both
measures or had more survey expenses than court record medical debt. 119 About
one-fifth of the sample clearly had out-of-pocket expenses that were at least
$1,000 more than their Schedule F medical debt, and often the difference was
more than $5,000 or more than $10,000. 12 Cases fitting this description reveal
most clearly the difficulties of relying on only court records; they also present the
most interesting questions of how these households managed to reduce medical
obligations in the midst of financial problems.
Although the additional analysis using this scale focuses on this fifth of
respondents, we must emphasize that this is not a comprehensive count of people
with serious medical burden. Some respondents with very significant medical

°

119. In the group of cases on the negative side of the scale, Schedule F medical debt exceeded
the questionnaire reports of expense. We strongly suspect that these cases can be explained by the
timing: the questionnaire asked for out-of-pocket expense only within the two years prior to filing.
By contrast, Schedule F captures debts older than two years. Some particularly big debts are likely
to be older. Notably, the presence of some cases with Schedule F debt older than two years and no
recent out-of-pocket expense slightly dampens the discrepancy between these two measures of
medical burden. A small number of such cases may not only raise the Schedule F medical debt
averages, but also could make the highest dollar category of medical bills (see supra p. 268, fig.2)
seem more consistent across measures than it really is. Although we believe this to be the dominant
explanation, particularly for the cases in the "-4" and "-3" categories, we offer several others as
well. While completing the exact dollar amounts on Schedule F, respondents may have been more
likely to have been consulting direct documentation and to be completing the paperwork with a
lawyer. A debtor who estimated even a few dollars less on the questionnaire could create a
discrepancy when this measure was compared with Schedule F medical debt. Most discrepancies
on the negative side of the scale are within a one or two point difference, and thus potentially are of
smaller amounts. Also, some medical providers impose interest and/or finance charges. A
respondent may have recalled and reported only principal on the questionnaire, while Schedule F
lists the legally collectible debt that includes these additional amounts. Finally, although the coding
error rate in this study was very low, error remains a possible explanation. For the rate, see Lawless
et al., supra note 95, app.
120. We refer here to categories "+2," "+3," and "+4," which represent having out-of-pocket
expenses of at least $ I ,000 more, $5,00 I more, or $10,00 I more, respectively, than Schedule F
medical debt. The 20% figure is premised on missing variables being included in the total count.
See infra app. A.
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bills do not have verifiable discrepancies between the court record and survey
measures. The most populous group of filers, whose expenses fall within the
same category on both measures (as indicated by a "zero"), is very diverse
regarding the amounts of medical debt these respondents faced both before and
during bankruptcy. For example, 11 % of all respondents who are a "zero" had
over $10,000 of expenses in both the questionnaire and Schedule F. Such a
respondent may have owed $50,000 in medical bills beforehand and could either
continue to owe those bills to a provider or have reduced them to some amount
above $10,000 identifiable as medical bills on Schedule F. An additional 4% had
between $5,000 and $10,000 of medical expenses on both measures. 121 The
average Schedule F medical debt for this "zero" group is just under $5,000,
suggesting that individuals could, in fact, have paid thousands of dollars towards
their medical debt while still occupying the same category of expenses on the
two measures. Cases that are a single category greater as recorded by the survey
method compared to the court record method (a"+ 1" in Appendix A) also mask a
wide range of dollar differences and significant medical obligations for the same
reasons. 122
With respect to the fifth of the sample with the biggest verifiable
discrepancies between the measures, a variety of possibilities could explain why
the same debtor reported a large amount of medical expenses in the questionnaire
but had little (or no) identifiable Schedule F medical debt. There is the standard
problem that some medical providers or their debt collectors do not have
123
medical-sounding identities that court record coders can discern.
Also, having
more questionnaire-reported medical expenses than Schedule F medical debt
could reflect that individuals on the brink of bankruptcy paid off some or all of
their medical bills. 124 Such payoff would not necessarily signify a lack of

121. Forty percent of those who have the same category of medical expense on the
questionnaire and medical debt on Schedule F had no out-of-pocket medical expenses or medical
debt.
122. Those respondents that fall in the "+1" category have, on average, just under $1,000 in
Schedule F medical debt and are most likely to report less than $1,000 in out-of-pocket expenses in
the two years prior to filing. However, like the "zeros," these individuals could easily have large
differences in the amount of expense and Schedule F medical debt. For example, some respondents
indicated more than $10,000 in expense and reported between $9,000 and $10,000 in medical debt
on Schedule F. It is possible that they had $10,001 in expenses and only paid off $100 of that debt,
putting them in one category lower, but it also is possible that respondents had $25,000 in expenses
and paid $15,100 off those expenses off prior to bankruptcy.
123. See infra note 152.
124. See generally Christopher Tarver Robertson, Michael Hoke & Richard Egelhof, Get Sick,
Get Out: The Medical Causes of Home Mortgage Foreclosures, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 65, 90-92
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financial burden from the bills; money is fungible and financially distressed
families constantly make difficult choices about how to juggle expenses. Those
filers most concerned with maintaining relationships with doctors could have
fought very hard to pay these expenses while defaulting on other major
obligations or satisfying those obligations using credit cards. 125 We can test the
payoff hypothesis by looking at how the filers report managing their medical
expenses, paying careful attention to the reported use of cash or cash equivalents.
In addition, some existing medical bills might simply be missing from
Schedule F. This could be due to inadvertence, 126 a mistaken belief that insurance
would fully cover a pre-bankruptcy procedure, 127 or a more intentional effort to
hide the bankruptcy from a provider (who, if not listed, may not hear about the
case) to avoid a feared disruption in health care. 128 The possibility that these
circumstances explain the complete disappearance of a medical bill can be
explored in part by looking at cases in which complete payoff would be most
unlikely due to the size of the bills.
As the literature review suggested, reporting more expenses on the
questionnaire than medical debt on Schedule F also could be due to the use of a
credit card, home equity loan, or less formal borrowing to finance part or all of
medical bills. In such an instance, out-of-pocket medical expenses, even if not
paid fully by the time of filing bankruptcy, would not appear as Schedule F
medical debt. Or, Schedule F medical debt would be lower in amount while debt
to other creditors would likely be higher.
Discrepancies also could reflect that people overly attribute their financial
problems on questionnaires to medical issues, which seem like a socially
acceptable basis for overindebtedness. 129 Due to the methods employed here, this
is less likely to explain the discrepancy in this study. The discrepancy reflected in

(2008) (reporting statements of foreclosure defendants that they had reallocated money intended for
their mortgages toward medical bills).
125. It also is possible that providers gave respondents significant discounts for prompt
payment that remain invisible to us, although those payments could have come from another credit
source.
126. See, e.g., In re Hocum, 119 B.R. 723 (Bania. D.S.D. 1990) (granting debtor's postdischarge request to amend Schedule F to include accidentally omitted $262.94 hospital bill that
had been assigned to debt collector).
127. For example, in one case, the debtor originally failed to list a medical debt on Schedule F
because he thought Medicare would fully cover his cataract operation. He amended Schedule F
once he realized his error. See In re Nosier, 2007 WL 4322315 (Bania. M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2007).
128. See Jacoby et al., supra note 71, at 383.
129. See id. at 384-85 for discussions of overmedicalization generally.

272

MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS

Figure 2 and the text is based on a purely factual question about out-of-pocket
obligation not covered by insurance. The 2007 CBP questionnaire did not ask
people about "medical debt," which could be susceptible to inconsistent
interpretations. Thus, the survey method variable for out-of-pocket expenses is
straightforward. In addition, when respondents were asked to indicate their
reasons for filing for bankruptcy-the place where overmedicalization would be
most suspected-they did not merely check every available reason for filing that
might be sympathetic. Indeed, only three out of ten respondents explicitly
indicated medical bills as a reason for bankruptcy, even though far more reported
substantial out-of-pocket medical expenses and had other indicators of distress. 130
In other words, it is possible that respondents have assigned too little
responsibility to their medical problems for their financial downfall. 131 Even the
greatest skeptics of the studies by Himmelstein et al. would be unlikely to
suggest that the three out of ten people who reported medical bills as a reason for
bankruptcy lacked any medical liability.
To begin our assessment of the possible explanations for discrepancies
between the court record and survey methods, we look at the raw percentages on
the use of cash, credit cards, and home equity loans for people with any medical
expenses not covered by insurance. 132 These absolute percentages of credit usage
presumably are dampened by the proximity to bankruptcy when some filers
already have consumed their available credit. 133 But the overall frequency is less

130. Respondents in our sample selected an average of 4.33 reasons for filing out of a total of
19. Respondents who included the medical bill reason had a slightly higher average (5.75), but this
can be explained by the fact that there was a strong association between reporting medical bills as a
reason and the other medical reasons on the list of responses. For more information about the
indication of medical reasons for filing, see infra p. 281, fig.6.
13 I. Jacoby & Warren, supra note 33.
132. The percentages in Figure 3 vary slightly from those in Appendix B because the
questionnaire variables had fewer missing data points. Appendix B looks at these variables in
combination with the court record variables, which reduced the number of observations. Also,
Appendix B shows the difference in home equity loan use if one includes all who reported expense
regardless of housing tenure.
133. We do not know the credit limits of our respondents. Because credit limits are not
regularly reported in the general population, studies have used various techniques to estimate them.
See ROBERT B. AVERY ET AL., AN OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER DATA AND CREDIT REPORTING, FED.
REs. BULL. 58 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2003/
0203lead.pdf. The most common approach is to use the highest balance ever reported as the credit
limit. Using this technique, Avery et al. found in their 2003 paper that about 25% of revolving
accounts in the general population had a credit limit below $1,000; 41 % had a credit limit between
$1,000 and $4,999; and only a very small percentage had a credit limit of $25,000 or more. Id.
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important than the circumstances under which respondents used credit. Figure 3
shows medical bill payment methods broken down by those respondents who
reported that medical bills were a reason that they filed for bankruptcy and those
who did not. This breakdown demonstrates that respondents who indicated
medical bills as a reason for filing use regular credit cards and home equity loans
at a much higher level. In this Figure, the vertical axis shows the percentage of
respondents with medical expenses. 134 The horizontal axis is a breakdown of the
use of different methods of paying medical bills.
FIGURE

3: METHODS OF MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS
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Figure 3 illustrates that those who reported medical bills as a reason for
bankruptcy said they used home equity for medical bills nearly four times as
frequently as the other respondents, and had a higher rate, by more than a third,
of using credit cards to pay medical bills. 135 The markedly higher use of home

Looking at the overall profile ofrevolving accounts, the average credit limit was about $4,500. Id.
134. Here, as before, we examine only those respondents who indicated having any out-ofpocket medical expense in the two years prior to filing for bankruptcy.
135. Differences between those with a medical bill reason for filing and those without a
medical bill reason for filing are statistically significant (p-value :::: .05) for use of both credit cards
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equity loans and credit cards to pay medical bills among those who reported
medical bills as a reason for filing is of particular importance to our analysis. If
an individual pays for medical care with a credit card or home equity loan, then
these expenses will not be identified as medical bills in court records. The data
presented in Figure 3 thus support a more nuanced and multi-instrument
approach to evaluating the effect of medical debt on bankruptcy filings.
We also examined the congruence between medical obligations captured by
the court record and survey methods depending on whether respondents listed a
medical bill reason for bankruptcy. Respondents who identified this reason for
filing for bankruptcy had, on average, twice the difference between survey
medical expenses and Schedule F medical debt as those who did not identify
medical bills as a reason for filing. 136 And, as noted in the introduction, over one
quarter (27%) of those who identified a medical bill reason for bankruptcy had
zero Schedule F medical debt, rendering them invisible in the court record
method.
To explore further the possible explanations for reduced or invisible medical
debt using the court record method, we look at the medical bill management of
respondents based on the levels of discrepancy between the two methods of
measurement. 137 Appendix B reports all of our results as well as whether the
differences are statistically significant using a traditional ANOV A test. 138 Figure
4 shows three important methods of responding to medical bills. It reports these
in groups that had increasing amounts of difference between the court record and
survey methods. If paying off medical bills in full were the explanation for the
decline or disappearance of medical bills by the time of bankruptcy, we would
expect to see high rates of reporting use of cash and cash equivalents by

and home equity loans. All differences, when tested across the three groups-I) all respondents
with medical expenses, 2) those with a medical bill reason for filing, and 3) those without a medical
bill reason for filing-are statistically significant with an ANOVA test. However, we cannot
identify which of the differences are causing that statistical significance. ANOV A is an "ANalysis
Of VAriance" test, which compares group means by analyzing comparisons of variance estimates
to determine whether the differences in means are statistically significant.
136. The difference is statistically significant. Overall, all respondents reported just over half
of a category more of medical expense than of Schedule F medical debt. Those who listed medical
bills as a reason for filing had, on average, approximately three-quarters of a category more of
medical expense than Schedule F medical debt. Those who did not indicate medical bills as a
reason for filing had less than 0.4 of a category more medical expense than Schedule F medical
debt.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 118-122.
138. As these variables are coded as "Yes" or "No" variables, the frequency can be essentially
understood as the percent of respondents in the group replying affirmatively to the question.
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respondents with the biggest gaps. Figure 4 and Appendix B show a pattern of
slightly decreasing use of cash, with the lowest frequency of cash usage reported
by those who reported over $10,000 of medical expenses on the questionnaire
but had no Schedule F medical debt. 139 The pattern in Figure 4 suggests that
having lower Schedule F medical debt is not due to individuals paying off
medical bills completely with cash, debit cards, or checks before filing for
bankruptcy.
FIGURE 4: USE OF CASH, CREDIT CARDS, AND HOME EQUITY LOANS FOR MEDICAL
BILLS, BY GAP IN MEASURES
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By contrast, Figure 4 illustrates a positive relationship between the reported
use of a regular credit card to pay medical bills and the difference between the
reported expenses on the questionnaire and Schedule F medical debt. 140 This is

139. The difference in use of cash, debit cards, and checks is statistically significant to the
0.002 level. Using the ANOV A method of testing the differences in the groups does not allow us to
identify which differences are statistically significant, but does allow us to demonstrate that the
overall patterns of use vary enough to be statistically significant.
140. The differences in use of a regular credit card for medical bills are statistically significant

276

MANAGING MEDICAL BILLS

consistent with the concern that debts transferred to credit cards become
minimized or invisible in court record studies. 141
Filers with significantly greater out-of-pocket expenses than Schedule F
medical debt also indicated use of home equity loans with much greater
frequency. 142 This is especially true for those with at least $10,001 more in
expenses than Schedule F medical debt; over a quarter of this group used home
equity loans to pay medical debts. This is in sharp contrast to the overall rate of
5.8% who used a home equity loan to pay off medical debt among all
homeowners in the 2007 CBP.
Appendix C displays the comparative medical bill management for the group
of respondents with more than $10,000 in expenses reported on the questionnaire
and zero Schedule F medical debt. Members of this small group would have had
to expend significant effort to pay off $10,000-or much more-completely in
cash before bankruptcy. Also, this biggest of possible differences between the
measures would be less likely to be due to forgetfulness about medical bills,
partial payoff of medical bills, seeking to hide their bankruptcy cases from
providers, or other such explanations. Respondents in this group reported using
home equity loans for medical bills at over four times the frequency of everyone
else; they also reported using credit cards twice as often as everyone else.

to the <0.001 level. Like anyone reporting medical expense on the questionnaire, the group that
reported over $10,000 of debt on Schedule F and zero expense on the questionnaire would have
skipped the question about managing out-of-pocket expense and thus had the "lowest" use of all
methods of payment.
141. As another measure, when we isolated and compared the Schedule F medical debt of
those who indicated using credit cards for medical bills from those who did not so indicate, the
credit card users reported lower average and median medical debts. However, credit card users had
nearly twice the amount of credit card debt. Credit card users had $5,264 average Schedule F
medical debt versus $6,841 for non-credit card users. We also compared medians: those who used
credit cards to pay medical bills had a median Schedule F medical debt of $1,473, compared to
$1,791 for those who did not use a credit card. The difference is significant to the 0.05 level. Those
who reported using a regular credit card to pay for medical expenses filed, on average, $31,853 in
credit card debt on Schedule F, compared to $15,792 in credit card debt for those who did not use a
regular credit card to pay medical expenses.
142. Figure 4 portrays the percentages of those who owned a home and used a home equity
loan for medical expenses; if we look at all filers, (i.e. not just those who owned a home in the last
five years) we see a similar pattern, but smaller numbers. For example, 19% of those in the highest
group report using a home equity loan, compared to 3% of those reporting the same amount on both
measures. The differences exhibited using either methods of measurement are statistically
significant to the 0.0001 level. All data on the individual breakdown of use of home equity loans
are available in Appendix B.
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Generally, filers with the greatest amounts of out-of-pocket expenses but zero
Schedule F medical debt had a much higher rate of reporting that they shifted
obligations to alternate creditors that are undetectable as medical on court
records.
To further corroborate these findings, we looked at the amount reported on
Schedule F of claims owed to credit card lenders (as opposed to claim holders
with medical identities). 143 Figure 5 reports the results.
FIGURE 5: AVERAGE SCHEDULE
MEASURES
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As Figure 5 shows (and is reported more fully in Appendix D) the amount of
Schedule F credit card debt grows as the gap increases between the survey and
court record methods of identifying medical obligation. 144 The filers represented

143. It can be difficult to identify credit card debt because of the variety of ways debt can be
listed on Schedule F. Although we would get the same results either way as the next footnote
explains, we used a very conservative, lower bound definition of credit card debt by using only debt
in which the listing contained the words "credit card," "card," "revolving credit," "charge account,"
or closely similar terms. Also, any listing that contained brand name words for a credit card, such
as "Visa," "MasterCard," or "Discover," was counted as definitely credit card debt.
144. This result is obtained with the "definitely credit card" variable, but the same pattern
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in Figure 5-the fifth of the sample with verifiably higher out-of-pocket
expenses than Schedule F medical debt-had much greater average credit card
debts than the $19,006 average credit card debt of all filers in the sample, and
also had higher median credit card debts than the median of the overall sample.
Again, this suggests that those with less Schedule F medical debt are not
necessarily paying off medical debt with ease, but rather are shifting medical
bills to alternate forms of credit. 145 These findings also support the story that
bankruptcy filers in our sample made their medical providers a higher priority
than other types of creditors. As money is fungible, these individuals went into
bankruptcy with lower medical debt but higher levels of credit card debt. 146 In
addition to the court record information on credit card usage, we find a parallel
trend regarding home mortgages. As the gap grows between the questionnaire
medical expenses and Schedule F medical debt, so do the amounts of secured
claims against filers' residences. 147 This generally corroborates filers' reporting
of home equity use for medical bills.
We explored other indicators that might shed light on why medical expenses
are not appearing on Schedule F. The 2007 CBP questionnaire asked respondents
to indicate whether they engaged in a variety of methods to "make ends meet"
during the previous two years. 148 We were interested in whether respondents with

emerged when we conducted the same analysis with the "probably credit card" variable, as well as
with the two measures combined.
145. The pattern is the same for both chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases, but the amounts in
chapter 7 cases are higher for cases fitting the two left-most columns on Figure 5.
146. These results are consistent with an earlier analysis of no-asset chapter 7 cases by
researchers at the Executive Office for United States Trustees (in DOJ), in which Schedule F credit
card debt levels were particularly high among filers with no observable medical debt on Schedule
F. See Ed Flynn & Gordon Bermant, Credit Card Debt in Chapter 7 Cases, AM. BANKR. INST. J.,
Dec. 2003/Jan. 2004, at 20 (credit card debt of those with no Schedule F medical debt was higher
than those with Schedule F medical debt and "was more than twice as high as for debtors who
listed at least $5,000 in medical debt"); see also MICHELLE M. DOTY ET AL., SEEING RED: THE
GROWING BURDEN OF MEDICAL BILLS AND DEBT FACED BY U.S. FAMILIES (Commonwealth Fund
Issue Brief, 2008), available at http://www.comrnonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/lssueBriefs/2008/Aug/Seeing-Red--The-Growing-Burden-of-Medical-Bills-and-Debt-Faced-by-U-S-F amilies.aspx.
147. Home owners with the highest level of difference between medical expenses and
Schedule F medical debt (i.e. at least $10,001 more in medical expenses than Schedule F medical
debt) also have the highest level of secured claims against their residences, a dollar figure which
declines as the difference between medical expenses and Schedule F medical debt decreases ..
148. The questionnaire asked: "During the TWO years before the bankruptcy, did EITHER
you or a spouse or partner DO, or TRY TO DO, any of the following things in order to make ends
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increasingly greater questionnaire-reported expenses than Schedule F medical
debt were more likely to report "Consolidated debts with a credit card or new
loan" or "Put necessities on the credit card (for example, food or monthly bills)"
as coping options. As Appendix E shows, those with higher expenses than
Schedule F medical debt were more likely to say that they put necessities on the
credit card. 149
Finally, we tum back to filers' stated reasons for bankruptcy, which in
Figure 6 are broken down based on the size of the difference between the court
record and survey measures of expenses. This helps determine the consequences
of relying exclusively on the court record method to measure medical-related
financial burden. As Figure 6 shows and Appendix F reports more fully, as the
gap between the court record and survey measures grows, so does the percentage
of respondents who indicated medical bills as a reason for filing for bankruptcy
(the left-most column in each grouping). These findings suggest that the court
record method particularly under-represents medical bill problems for filers who
reported medical reasons for filing for bankruptcy.

meet? (Check all that apply.)" Possible responses were: "Worked more hours or got another job;
Cashed out or borrowed from a retirement, a 401k, a pension account or life insurance; Refinanced
your home, took out a home equity loan or line of credit, or took out a debt consolidation loan that
was secured by your home; Sold your house; Asked creditors, such as landlords or credit card
companies, to work with you on the payments; Sold or pawned a car, furniture, or other personal
property; Consolidated debts with a credit card or new Joan; Used a payday loan business (for
example, Check to Cash) or car title lender to borrow money or take a cash advance; Put necessities
on the credit card (for example, food or monthly bills); Accepted or borrowed money from family
or friends; Accepted or borrowed money from a religious group or charity; or Something else."
149. They were not more likely to say that they consolidated debt on a credit card or new loan,
but it is not obvious that respondents would conceptualize moving medical bills to credit cards as a
consolidation.
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FIGURE 6: MEDICAL-RELATED REASONS FOR FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY, BY
GAP IN MEASURES
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Figure 6 presents the distribution of individuals who said that medical bills,
medical problems of self or spouse, or medical problems of other family
members were a reason for filing. Again, this distribution is categorized by the
difference between the medical expenses reported on the questionnaire and the
amount of medical debt reported on Schedule F. Note that two-thirds of
respondents with more than $10,000 in medical expenses on the questionnaire
and zero medical debt on Schedule F reported that medical bills were a reason for
filing for bankruptcy. Thus, Figure 6, like Figure 3, shows that those most
affected by medical debt are less likely to show up in a court records study. 150
Had we conducted our study relying entirely on court records as the DOJ did in
2005, our medical debt count would not have included a single member of this

150. While the number of cases that fall into the category of $10,000 or more expenses
reported on the survey and zero Schedule F medical debt is small (19 cases in our sample), this
group represents a very conservative method of analyzing medical debt in bankruptcy.
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group. 151 For the other respondents represented on Figure 6, a study relying
exclusively on the court record method would have significantly understated their
medical burden.
The analysis for this project has limits. First, as noted earlier, any attempt to
code medical debts from court records risks the omission of providers or related
parties with no obvious health care designation in its name; our study is no
exception. 152 This limit is consistent with our conclusion that multi-instrument
studies are preferable to exclusive reliance on court records for some kinds of
research questions. Second, the questionnaire did not ask respondents to identify
the precise type of health care that they received, precluding a correlation of type
of care and medical bill management for the full sample. 153 Third, the nature of
the data collection ultimately required that we compare a continuous variable
(Schedule F medical debt) with a categorical one (pre-bankruptcy out-of-pocket
expenses) based on dollar ranges. The categories are the most precise measures
available for out-of-pocket estimates for the full dataset. Fourth, the variables are
drawn considerably from self-reported questionnaire data and thus face the same
challenges as other interview and questionnaire studies. 154 But to emphasize, this
limit applies to the court records as well. This is not a situation in which a debtor

15 I. The same pattern holds for illness of self or partner as a reason for filing. Familial
medical problems were noted as a cause of bankruptcy by a smaller group of filers, but show
similar patterns: 25% of the group with the biggest gap between medical expenses and Schedule F
medical debt selected familial medical problems as a reason for bankruptcy, compared to 10.7% of
the sample population. A full breakdown of the distribution into these categories is available in
Appendix F.
152. For example, CSI Financial Services "takes over" a patient's account and offers extended
payment plans, but the hospital takes back the debts upon a patient's default on a payment plan.
Haugh, supra note 18, at 18. Neither CSI Financial Services nor the banks doing the interim
financing would be detected as medical on Schedule F under most coding protocols. Some bulk
medical debt buyers do not have medical-sounding names. See generally In re Andrews, 394 B.R.
384 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2008) (discussing bulk buyers in a different context).
153. Diagnosis information was collected via telephone interview and thus is available only
for the subset of respondents who participated in that portion of the study.
154. Those who conduct research relying on interview and questionnaire data have long
struggled with two principal issues. First, the nature of human response introduces a higher degree
of error into the data. See John Bound, Charles Brown & Nancy Mathiowetz, Measurement Error
in Survey Data, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMETRICS 3705 (2001). Second, asking questions about
finances and health, two private topics, might introduce additional error. See Marianne Bertrand &
Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data,
91 AM. ECON. REv. 67, 68 (2001). In the context of our analysis, however, we believe that our
findings contribute meaningfully to our understanding of an otherwise unexplained discrepancy.
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says one thing while a court or creditor says another; in many consumer
bankruptcy cases, nearly all of the documents in the court records are submitted
by the debtor. Fifth, this study is designed to analyze bankruptcy filers. This
means that we cannot directly comment on how non-filers deal with their medical
bills. 155 Sixth, we compare court records and questionnaire data for a sample that
was drawn in 2007, whereas the DOJ sample was collected in the early 2000s. 156
We cannot prove, of course, that a survey conducted in the early 2000s on the
sample captured by the DOJ would replicate our results. But, as Table I
illustrates, our Schedule F data and the DOJ data (reported in Table 1) are
similarly patterned.
We also should take care to note some significant demographic patterns in
expense and medical bill management that affect the accuracy of relying only on
court records. 157 For example, homeowners and non-homeowners had equal
frequency of identifiable Schedule F medical debt, as well as similar distributions
across the dollar ranges of Schedule F medical debt. 158 But on the questionnaire,
homeowners were more likely to report incurring expenses within the two years
prior to filing (81 % versus 73 %) and had a different distribution of expenses than
non-homeowners. Homeowners also were more likely to report using credit
cards-and, of course, home equity loans-for medical bills than non-

155. We see glimpses of a difference between the bankruptcy population and the general
population. For example, in the tracking survey of the Center for Studying Health System Change,
more than half of respondents who reported problems paying medical bills said that providers
suggested that they undertake payment plans. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 28, at 3. Even among
bankruptcy filers who identified medical bills as a reason for bankruptcy, only about a third
reported being in payment plans directly with their providers; it is possible that providers suggested
plans to more of them. We will discuss provider payment plans in more depth in a separate paper.
156. See supra p. 265, tbl.1. Medical costs rose at a rate outpacing inflation generally in the
2000s, and self-pay obligation did as well. Although our literature review focuses largely on more
recent publications, we do not believe that medical practice management advice was qualitatively
different in the first half of the decade. See Jacoby & Warren, supra note 33. We do not know of a
theory on which the enactment of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments would affect our results.
157. We found few statistically significant differences in the average amount of Schedule F
medical debt among those with differing education levels, gender, race, or living arrangements. We
also tested for a variety of demographic differences in medical bill management-for instance, age,
race, gender, homeownership, and marital status-and again many were not significant. For
example, we did not find a significant difference in bill management between respondents who
indicated that they lived with a permanent partner and those who lived alone.
158. The homeownership variable includes everyone who reported owning a home within five
years prior to filing.
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homeowners. 159 A stand-alone analysis of the court records would blunt these
differences.
We encountered a similar phenomenon regarding medical expenses among
petitioners who identified as African American versus petitioners who identified
as white. 160 In our sample, there was not a statistically significant difference
between African American petitioners and white petitioners in the frequency or
average amount of Schedule F medical debt. 161 But on the questionnaire, African
American petitioners reported lower levels of out-of-pocket medical expenses
than most other petitioners, and African American petitioners with medical
expenses were much less likely to use credit cards or home equity loans (but just
as likely to use cash) for the bills they did incur. 162 African American petitioners

159. Nearly three out often (27.9%) of those petitioners who owned a home in the five years
prior to bankruptcy reported using a regular credit card to pay their medical bills, compared to 17 %
of those who did not own a home. As previously noted, 5.8% of homeowners used a home equity
loan to pay medical bills. Strangely, 1.2% of filers who said they did not own a home at any time in
the prior five years selected this option on the questionnaire. It is possible that the language of the
selection led them to believe that this option included lines of credit not secured by homes. Or, they
may have used someone else's home as collateral. In any event, this difference, like the difference
in credit card usage, is statistically significant to the <0.001 level.
160. The written questionnaire asked respondents to indicate the group with which they
identified, with the options of "African American or Black, Asian American, Hispanic or Latino/a,
White or Caucasian, Other (please specify), or none." The questionnaire asked for the same
information about partners of respondents. For the comparisons, we included in our measure
African American respondents who reported no partner (57%) or identified his or her partner as
African American (31 %), which is the great majority of the respondents who identified as African
American.
161. Among households with African American petitioners, 49.4% listed medical debt on
Schedule F, compared to 52.6% of white filers. Households with African American petitioners
listed smaller average medical debt ($5,688 per household) than did white filers ($6,513). But both
of these differences are outside the standard levels for statistical significance. Households with
African American petitioners, however, had a lower median Schedule F medical debt ($1,349) than
white petitioners ($1,746), and this difference is significant to the 0.05 level. The DOJ report used
averages, not medians, and thus would not have captured this difference.
162. 76% of African American respondents reported using cash to pay medical bills, versus
77% percent of white respondents, a difference that is not statistically significant. African
American petitioners with medical expense were much less likely than white petitioners to report
using a credit card to pay medical bills (11.3% versus 30.1 %). This difference persists when we
examine the use of home equity loans to pay off medical expense (1. 7% versus 5.3%), and when
we focus on only those who owned homes some time within the five years prior to filing (2.2%
versus 6.9%). The difference in credit card and home equity loan use (including either
measurement) is significant to the <0.001 level.
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also had significantly less general credit card debt in their court files than other
respondents. Looking at the patterns across the distribution of both measures of
medical burden, it appears that African American petitioners in our sample were
less likely than white petitioners to have reduced or eliminated medical bills
owed directly to providers by the time they got to bankruptcy. We cannot control
for the variables that might be driving this finding, such as differences in access
to medical care and credit. 163 Whatever the explanation, Schedule F and the court
record method are somewhat more (though not perfectly) reflective of the prebankruptcy burdens of African American respondents in this sample than they
are of the pre-bankruptcy burdens of white filers.
A final example comes from the small group of youngest filers: households
with at least one petitioner under twenty-five. The youngest filers reported
having Schedule F medical debt with much greater frequency than any other age
group or all other age groups combined. In addition, on average, households in
which at least one of the filers was under twenty-five had an average medical
debt on Schedule F of $13,263, compared to an average of $5,846 for all other
age groups. 164 Yet, relying on this finding alone would overstate young filers'
relative likelihood of having out-of-pocket medical expenses in the two years
prior to filing, and may speak instead to their lack of financing options. These
filers were less likely than other households to report using a regular credit card
for medical bills and had less general credit card debt in their files overall. 165
They were also more likely to report using a provider payment plan or doing

163. As noted earlier, we tested for a variety of other differences based on race and sex
relating to medical bills and medical bill management, and they were not significant. According to
one prior study, African American families are three times as likely as white families to file for
bankruptcy, but their reasons for filing are similar. See Elizabeth Warren, The Economics of Race:
When Making It to the Middle Jsn 't Enough, 61 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 1777, 1779 (2004).
164. Although the youngest filers had a much higher average Schedule F medical debt than
everyone else, the difference between the medians ($1,672 for the youngest versus $1,590 for the
older filers) is not statistically significant, suggesting that a small number of the youngest filers
with huge Schedule F medical debts skews the average. We see a glimpse of this in Figure l, where
three out of the six filers with Schedule F medical debts over $100,000 were under the age of
twenty-five. On a filer-by-filer basis, the very youngest respondents were also much more likely to
have the same category of medical expense on both measures than everyone else (46% versus
36%).
165. Among households in which either petitioner was under twenty-five years old, 18.9%
reported using credit cards for medical bills, compared to 24% of all other petitioners. This
difference is not statistically significant. These youngest filers also had a lower frequency of home
equity loan use for medical bills (2.1 % versus 4.2% for all other petitioners), but this difference is
outside traditional levels for statistical significance.
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"something else" about a medical bill, which often meant waiting to discharge
the bill in bankruptcy. 166 Both of these latter options increase the likelihood of a
pre-bankruptcy medical bill showing up as Schedule F medical debt. Likewise, a
much greater proportion of bankrupt households with younger women petitioners
(34 and younger) retained direct obligation that appeared as Schedule F medical
debt than other groups. But such households were less likely to use a regular
credit card or a home equity loan for medical bills and much more likely than
others to use a provider payment plan or "something else" as compared to other
households. 167
These demographic observations warrant further study with additional
controls. But this preliminary look reveals another layer of complexity that seems
to be disregarded by those who rely exclusively on court records to measure
medical debt burden.

N. DISCUSSION
This Article is the first to demonstrate through detailed systematic analysis
that the DOJ's court record method, standing alone, is an unreliable measure of
the financial burden of illness or injury faced by bankruptcy filers. In our
nationally-representative sample of filers, the court record method produced a
skewed undercount of medical bills and failed to account for filers with
significant medical hardship who had no debt on Schedule F that could be
identified as medical. The shifting of medical obligations to creditors with nonmedical identities played a large role in the discrepancy between court record and
survey information, particularly for respondents with the largest verifiable gaps
in measures. Absent changes to the forms on which information about debts is
collected, the DOJ court record methodology should not be used to measure the
financial burden of health care on bankrupt families.
The demographic assessment suggests that court records better reflect
medical bills for some groups of filers than for others. Yet court records, standing
alone, are not well-suited to distinguish these filers on the relevant demographic
166. Petitioners under twenty-five years of age with out-of-pocket expense reported provider
payment plans 27.4% of the time, compared to all other petitioners, who reported payment plans
22.8% of the time. 21 % of the younger petitioners reported doing "something else" to handle
expenses, compared to 9.5% of all other petitioners. Both of these differences are statistically
significant to the 0.005 level.
167. Looking at the use of credit, the difference between the groups is significant to the
<0.001 level using a standard ANOVA test. The difference in use of "something else" is also
statistically significant to the <0.00 I level, while the difference in the use of cash is too small to be
statistically significant.
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criteria such as age and racial identity. Furthermore, lawmakers and scholars who
have been relying on the DOJ court record study have made no public efforts to
draw such distinctions.
The clock cannot be turned back to 2005, when the DOJ analysis enabled
lawmakers to vote with a clearer conscience in favor of the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 and against amendments that
members of Congress proposed to protect people with medical problems from
certain harsher effects of the bill. 168 However, our study should guide the use and
interpretation of these kinds of studies in other contexts.
In combination with other methods, the court record method has
unappreciated utility to shed light on the impact of patients' bankruptcies on
providers. Consistent with the medical practice advice reviewed in Part II, health
care consultants are concerned that "the last bill people pay is often their
healthcare debt." 169 One might have thought that families headed to bankruptcy
court would overwhelmingly defer dealing with their medical bills. However, in
our national sample, due to filers' payment and credit activities between the time
of treatment and the time of bankruptcy, fewer bankruptcy filings directly
affected medical providers, and for substantially smaller amounts. Nearly 80% of
bankruptcy filers had received medical services or goods resulting in some selfpay obligation within two years before they filed for bankruptcy-while many
already were struggling financially. And yet despite their financial hardship, a
third of filers with medical obligation had managed to protect their providers
entirely from the bankruptcy process, and many others reduced the dollar amount
of the obligation. 170 Some filers who reported the largest possible out-of-pocket

168. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, Bankruptcy Reform and the Cost of Sickness: Exploring the
Intersections, 71 Mo. L. REv. 903, 908 n.21 (2006) (reviewing failed medical-related amendments
to the 2005 Act). We recognize that the legislation as a whole had been pending in various forms
since 1997, and lawmakers across the political spectrum were evidently responsive to credit
industry pressure to enact it. See generally Melissa B. Jacoby, Negotiating Bankruptcy Legislation
Through the News Media, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1091, 1118 (2004).
169. Robert Czerwinksi & Peter M. Friend, Selling Written-Off AIR, HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT.,
Sept. 2008, at 128, 130; see also A New World of Health Care: More Patients Seek Help with Bills,
HEALTH CARE COLLECTOR (Aspen Publishers, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2008, at I (citing an industry
expert saying, "As everyone knows, we are often the last bill people pay. I thought it was telling
this past month when we heard people say they had to buy books, pay school fees, or pay for their
kids' participation in sports so they could not pay the hospitals. Why? Other folks won't let you in
without paying, but hospitals will.").
170. In theory, preferential transfer law polices eve-of-bankruptcy payoffs of creditors,
including medical providers. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2006); Cruse v. Hannibal Health Care Sys.
(In re Watkins), 325 B.R. 277 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2005) (applying preference law and ruling for
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expenses within the two years prior to filing had no medical providers as
creditors in the court records. Schedule F also includes debt older than two years,
which increases the debt captured by the court record method. This suggests that
our study is a fairly conservative measure of providers' reduction of exposure to
their patients' bankruptcies within the two years prior to filing. Thus, a better
way to use the court record method is combined with other sources to reveal the
extent to which medical providers extricate themselves from the process and
consequences of patients' bankruptcies.
V. CONCLUSION
Regardless of whether they are insured, nearly all patients have direct
monetary dealings with their medical providers. A body of advice and
technological tools help providers manage risks associated with this financial
exposure. The advice and tools encourage the use of third-party credit. Our study
demonstrates how these practices affect the empirical study of medical burden on
patients. In our sample, an exclusively court record study does not merely
produce a more conservative measure of medical burden; it hides or diminishes
cases in which medical bills were particularly significant.
The health care finance debate intensified the interest in medical bills among
financially distressed families such as those found in the bankruptcy system, and
the interest in this subject will not subside anytime soon. Our study urges caution
in using the DOJ court record analysis or other such studies to measure patient
medical debt on a standalone basis. It also casts doubt on efforts to refute survey
studies based on court documents alone. Absent changes to the forms on which
filers report their debts, or, perhaps, substantial changes in medical bill

trustee to recover execution on bond for payment of medical bills subject to state court judgment).
Although the law is not uniform, some courts find that a creditor is vulnerable to preference attack
even if the debtor simply substitutes another creditor (for example, a credit card or credit card
convenience check) to pay the antecedent debt. See, e.g., In re Marshall, 550 F.3d 1251 ( l 0th Cir.
2008); In re Wells, 382 B.R. 355 (6th Cir. BAP 2008); Flatau v. Walman Optical Co. (In re
Werner), 365 B.R. 283 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007). But for a variety of legal and practical reasons,
preference law is unlikely to have an effect on medical bill payment pre-filing in most consumer
bankruptcy cases. First, the preference period is relatively short (ninety days, as mentioned) unless
the beneficiary is an insider. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (2006) (setting 90-day preference period
generally and one year look-back period for insiders). Second, recipients of transfers of value less
than $600 have an absolute statutory defense to preference actions in consumer bankruptcy cases,
and thus case trustees would not pursue such cases. § 547(c)(8). Third, providers have a defense if
they accepted payment in the ordinary course of business, which Congress in 2005 defined broadly
to protect more payment recipients.§ 547(c)(2).
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management, court records alone reveal very little about the burden of medical
bills on financially distressed families. At best, when used in combination with
other instruments, such records help to shed light on the impact of patient
bankruptcy on health care providers-an important but distinct matter.
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APPENDIX A: DISTRIBUTION OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN QUESTIONNAIRE-REPORTED
OUT-OF-POCKET EXPENSES AND SCHEDULE F MEDICAL DEBT
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APPENDIX D: DEFINITE CREDIT CARD DEBT REPORTED ON SCHEDULE F, BY GAP IN
MEASURES

-4
-3
-2
-1
0
+l
+2
+3
+4
Total
Prob> F

Mean
(standard deviation)
$15,148.75
(24950.728)
$14,518.50
(25589.335)
$9,754.48
( 16860.425)
$13,457.91
(20811.045)
$15,075.98
(22072.988)
$19,892.82
(26959.325)
$27,334.37
(34652.081)
$28,890.91
(32613.587)
$34,523.00
(27361.75)
$18,837.03
(27361.75)
0.0000
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APPENDIX E: CREDIT CARDS To MAKE ENDS MEET, BY GAP IN MEASURES

-4

-3
-2
-1
0
+I
+2
+3
+4
Total
Prob> F

Put necessities on the credit card
(for example, food, or monthly bills)
Percent
(standard deviation)
47.4%
(0.513)
42.3%
(0.504)
40.6%
(0.494)
40.2%
(0.491)
52.3%
(0.5)
56.5%
(0.496)
65.7%
(0.475)
64.6%
(0.481)
75.0%
(0.439)

Consolidated debts with a
credit card or new loan
Percent
(standard deviation)

54.5%
(0.498)
0.0000
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(0.476)
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APPENDIX F: MEDICAL REASONS FOR FILING FOR BANKRUPTCY, BY GAP IN
MEASURES
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-3
-2
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0
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+2
+3
+4
Total
Prob
>F

Medical or health
care bills,
including
prescription
medications
Percent
(standard deviation)
21.1%
(0.419)
26.9%
(0.452)
22.9%
(0.423)
25.0%
(0.434)
27.9%
(0.449)
25.2%
(0.434)

Medical problems
experienced by you or
your spouse or partner

Medical problems of
other family members
(such as children or
parents)

Percent
(standard deviation)
26.3%
(0.452)
30.8%
(0.471)
29.2%
(0.457)
28.6%
(0.453)
28.9%
(0.454)
31.0%
(0.463)

Percent
(standard deviation)
5.3%
(0.229)
3.8%
(0.196)
8.3%
(0.278)
8.9%
(0.286)
9.0%
(0.286)
10.6%
(0.308)

32.4%
(0.469)
53.2%
Z{0.502)
66.7%
(0.478)

36.5%
(0.482)
46.8%
(0.502)
66.7%
(0.478)

13.1%
(0.338)
24.1%
(0.43)
25.0%
(0.439)

28.9%
(0.453)
0.0000

31.9%
(0.466)
0.0000

10.7%
(0.31)
0.0002
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